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The goal of this work is to investigate national, state and regime identities formation processes
and characteristics in Latvia in the context of widening European integration. This study has three
objectives:
1. to investigate the formation of new national, state and regime identity in Latvia; to analyse
links between political and ethnic pluralism; to discuss the role of ethnicity in political mobilisation
during transition to democracy; to analyse various manifestations of these identities including self-
consciousness, attitudes, behaviour, ideology, politics;
2. to compare national identity characteristics in Latvia and other European countries; to assess
the most important similarities and differences in identities on the social and demographic group and
country levels;
3. to investigate the Latvian population attitudes towards regional and European integration, to
analyse the factors that influence links between Latvia and other European countries.
We tried to analyse the objectives in several perspectives: How people think they ought to
behave, How they say they behave and How they really behave. Our study envisages four levels of
investigation. First, it is the biographical level of identity formation, change, transition, and
reconstruction throughout the life course. Second, the analyses of how identities find expression at the
situation level. Third, the study of identity as a set of codes, meanings, and stereotypes. Fourth, we
analysed links between dominant institutional frames and widespread identity forms in Latvia and
tried to explore what kinds of collective experience are likely to have impact on judgements of
identity.
Identity is a topic of growing interest not only for social scientists1, but also for broad
population. Political integration, market unification, formation of supra-state institutions in old
Europe develop new types of communities and identities beyond the nation state. Some theories
argue the rise of common European identity. The simultaneous strengthening of external border
controls between the EU and the outside world and the progressive reduction of cross-border controls
between member states has been referred to create a Fortress Europe. From the opposite -
disintegration perspective - the idea of national identity has been debated in connection with
regionalisation, as well as social exclusion, nationalism and racism. These issues as well as
immigration and multiculturalism are frequently debated themes in Latvia.
As noted Juris Dreifelds, Latvia is a country larger than Portugal. Holland and Denmark and
slightly smaller than Ireland, but Latvia is not well known, because until recently it offered very little
for scholar to write about2. Normally it is difficult to study the interaction between institutional and
cultural change, but recent political shifts in Eastern Europe, especially in countries regaining
independence, have created new opportunities to study the congruence between the system and the
self. Analyses of the Latvian population identity formation can be useful for scholars by one
important reason: Latvia is ethnically the most divided country of Eastern Europe. Russians and other
minorities constitute much larger share of the total population than it is in Estonia or Lithuania.
In our study we address the problem of transition towards a civil society and formation of
political nation with civil understanding of community, the process of acceptance of values, which are
grounded in European political tradition and culture. Previous researches in Latvia demonstrate that
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there are marked differences in ways in which various groups of population develop identification
with an ethnic group, the state and political regime3.
Our work is devoted to the investigation of national, state and regime identities formation
processes in Latvia. Project participants analysed: the formation of children's ethnicity; respondents
opinion about typical traits of Latvians and non-Latvians and their ethnic stereotypes; typical structure
of inter-ethnic networks and the causes and consequences of different patterns of inter-ethnic
networks; respondents attitude to inter-ethnic relations in Latvia; non-citizens attitude toward
citizenship; links between development of market economy in Latvia and identity formation;
participation of individuals in the social and political processes of society; problem of alienation; how
the pressure of local and global factors influences formation of national identity and changes system-
self relations; problems that impede integration of society; Latvian population attitudes towards
regional and European integration; the factors that influence Latvian population's attitude towards EU
enlargement.
Our study belongs to political science, on the one hand, and to the sociology of culture in the
widest sense of the word, including knowledge, ideas and styles of thought, on the other hand. We put
forward the idea that identities are constantly challenged, negotiated, reconstructed and maintained.
Identities are not just a state or traits of an individual that are relatively fixed and that there is not one
and the only real national identity of the Latvian people as a collective whole. We think that both -
ethnic origin, traditions, culture, on the one hand, and modern social institutions, on the other hand,
permanently constitute national identity. Preoccupation of custom or culture leads to blindness
toward social structure factors.
Project participants based their conclusions on different statistical sources and research data
(surveys World Values Survey, 1991; 1995, Nationalities in the Baltic States. 1994, "Describe
Your Nationality. 1991", The Formation of New Political Systems and the Question of Democratic
Stability: the Case of Latvia. 1993, New Baltic Barometer. 1995; 1997, ISSP surveys modules
"National Identity. 1995" and Role of Government. 1996, Central and Eastern European
Barometer (CEEB). 1998, Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the
European Union. 1997, Standard Eurobarometer (SEB). 1998, Consolidation of Democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe. 1997, Towards a Civic Society. 1998).
Very often it was difficult to compare data collected by different researchers because they used
similar, but not uniform indicators and scales or translated questions in unlike way. We think that
Latvian sociologist must devote more attention to harmonising of the indicators and researcher from
different Latvian institutions must improve their co-operation, especially those who are involved in
large scale international projects of comparative analyses.
The main conclusions of our study are:
1. Ethnic behavior of the largest part of Latvian population is governed by rational
calculation.
2. Economic cleavages, poverty, unemployment, social insecurity destroy the base of civil
society and social group solidarity, on the one hand, and stimulate ethnic mobilisation, on
the other hand.
3. Basic preconditions for the development of civil society in Latvia are diverse but not
exclusive group identities.
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4. Migrants have dual loyalty to their nations of origin and the nations amongst whom they
settle and this factor produces distrust and sense of insecurity in Latvian indigenous
population.
5. Historical background divides but images of future link different ethnic groups in Latvia.
During next studies participants of our team plan to devote more serious attention to the
comparison of our conclusions with findings of other East and West European social scientist and we
will try to test how our ideas can be incorporated in a larger scale theoretical framework.
4 1. Historical heritage
1. Historical heritage
Migration. It is difficult to evaluate contemporary processes of social integration and identity
formation in Latvia without reference to the situation in the mid-eighties. Throughout the Soviet
years, migration was the primary source of population growth and the basic reason for multifold
increase in the number of non-Latvians in Latvia and was one of the results of the Soviet Unions
economic and nationality policies. The greatest inflow of mass immigration occurred in the 1960s and
1970s. The ethnic composition of Latvia's population has been fundamentally altered by migration.
The 1989 census in Latvia fully revealed the consequences of the Soviet Unions nationality policies.
The percentage of Slavic residents (not counting Poles) rose to 42% (in the 1935 census, there were
196 913 Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians in Latvia or 10.3% of the population)4. On the other
hand, censuses illustrated the critical drop in the Latvian population, from 75.5% in 1935 to 52% in
1989.
A significant characteristic of this process was considerable re-emigration. Of those people who
arrived in Latvia in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, only one-third remained to live in the
republic. Between 1951 and 1990, there were 2,171,033 immigrants to Latvia and 1,801,839
emigrants from it. This is an enormous size of migration, considering that the entire population of
Latvia is under 2.5 million (in 1998 -- 2,458 403).
Table 1.1. - Migration (1951 - 1998) (thousands) 35
Immigration Emigration Net migration
Total Avg./year Total Avg./year Avg./year
1951-1960 64.0 51.7 12.3
1961-1970 47.7 40.0 7.7
1971-1980 54.9 46.1 8.8
1981-1990 50.6 42.3 8.3
1991-1995 30.8 6.2 145.8 29.2 -23.0
1991 14.7 25.5 -10.8
1992 6.2 53.1 -46.9
1993 4.1 32.0 -27.9
1994 3.0 21.9 -18.8
1995 2.8 13.4 -10.6
1996 2.7 10.0 -7.3
1997 2.9 9.7 -6.7
1998 3.1 6.3 -3.2
Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook of Latvia. Riga, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 1998; Pielikums Latvijas
statistikas ikm nesa biletenam Nr. 4/1999.
The highest rates of emigration have been registered in the districts and cities with high
concentration of former Soviet army personnel. Immigrants gravitated to the countrys larger
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industrial centres (83% of non-Latvians in the country are urban residents) which expanded
specifically for this purpose. Half of Latvias Russians live in Riga, making up a majority of the
capitals residents (47% in 1989, compared to 7.4% in 1935). The proportion of Latvians in Riga fell
from 63% in 1935 to 36% in 1989. Latvians have become an ethnic minority in their own capital.
Throughout the Soviet years a system of informal privileges existed for certain groups of the
population. The distribution of apartments is the most glaring manifestation of such privileges.
Latvians and Latvian citizens justifiably felt discriminated, because recent immigrants could more
easily acquire new apartments while the local population was forced to wait longer in apartment
queues or could not assume a place in the queue at all. For example, among residents of all housing
space constructed in the 1980s, only every fourth person was a Latvian5.
A large number of people migrated to Latvia during this period, people whose values and
understanding of history and interethnic relations were at variance with views prevailing among
Latvians. They and their children often did not learn Latvian and their communication with Latvians
was largely limited to the work place; they maintained the models of behavior to which they had
become accustomed. This period in Latvia saw a rapid development of a dual society marked not by
living together, but rather side-by-side. Interethnic contradictions were largely latent. Some of
these contradictions emerged during the transition, but powerful forces militating towards integration
have also been at work.
Non-Latvians have suffered something analogous to ethnic shock in the wake of the very rapid
shift in their role in terms of ethnic structure. If in the Soviet era they were a majority in the vast
home that was known as the Soviet Union, then in Latvia they are a minority in a small and
unknown country. This shock found expression in mass re-emigration and, in a few cases, in social
aggressiveness (especially among some Russian politicians). The data about immigration show that a
far larger group of people has migrated East, while the total number of people emigrating to the West
has been quite insignificant.





United States 133 387
Total 3 123 6 291
Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook of Latvia. Riga, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 1998.
This brief overview reveals the main problems that occurred in Latvia as the result of migration
processes. These are enormous migration patterns over a long period of time, which have served to
fundamentally alter the ethnic structure of the country, as well as the status of the indigenous nation.
Latvians were viewed as a minority in their own country, and ethnic minorities in the Soviet era were
treated in the worst possible way. The historical and cultural development of Latvia was suspended,
and the national self-understanding of the population was crippled. Even though Latvia has regained
its independence, it has not shed the burdens of the past. Despite this fact, there have been no social
conflicts in Latvia over ethnic matters, even though shortcomings in the countrys laws have
contributed to a certain sense of insecurity among non-citizens.
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Results of the ISSP module National Identity (1995) characterise the attitude of various ethnic
and social groups vis- -vis immigrants and refugees, and they also illustrate some of the factors which
complicate relations between the indigenous population and new arrivals.
Less than 1% of respondents thought that the number of immigrants in Latvia should be
increased. 12% of Latvians and 61% of Russians thought that the level should remain the same, but
87% of Latvians and 38% of Russians answered that the number should be reduced.
Table 1.3. - Attitudes to immigration
Immigration should be: Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Increased 0.4 1 7 6
Remain the same 12 61 29 23
Reduced 87 38 63 71
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
Data from our research can explain these intolerant views to some extent. 74% of Latvians and
36% of Russians agree with the statement that immigrants increase the crime level in Latvia.
Representatives of older generations, both Latvians and Russians, more frequently agreed with this
statement. Approximately the same percentage of respondents thinks that immigrants "steal" jobs
(69% of Latvians and 36% of Russians). Only 9% of Latvians agreed with the statement that
immigrants are beneficial to the Latvian economy (49% of Russians).
Table 1.4. - Attitudes toward immigrants
% agree: Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Immigrants increase crime rates 74 36 70 60
Immigrants steal jobs 69 36 21 17
Immigrants are good for economy 9 49 13 25
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, non-Latvians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
Data from previous research projects show that the attitudes of people in Latvia toward
refugees and immigrants have not changed significantly over time. In September and October of
1993, the question Do you think that refugees and immigrants threaten the peace and security of this
country? was answered in the affirmative by 31% of Latvians and 19% of non-Latvians (Baltic Data
House, Ltd.).
Latvias departure from the Soviet Union brought up instead the question of becoming involved
in Europe and concerned with it emigration of Latvians to the West. Societys views on emigration
are encapsulated in the response which respondents gave to the question If you could improve your
work or life conditions, how willingly or unwillingly would you move to another European country?.
Only 15% of respondents said that they would be very willing or somewhat willing to move, while
71% said that they would not like to move (55% saying that they would be very unwilling).
There are no significant differences in the percentage of Latvians and Russians who want to
emigrate, but a few trends can be spotted. A greater desire to emigrate is displayed by poorer people
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and young ethnic Latvians. Among Latvians who are younger than 25, 30% say that they are very or
somewhat eager to emigrate, but among Latvian students and schoolchildren, the figure is 45% (38%
saying that they are very eager to go). Among young Russians the same desire is expressed by 21% of
respondents (37% among students and schoolchildren). There are no significant differences between
Russians born in Latvia and those born elsewhere.
We also asked respondents how willing or unwilling they would be to move to a number of
different places if, by doing so, 'they could improve their work or living conditions'.
Table 1.5. - Willingness to move to different areas in order to improve work or living
conditions
% 'very' or 'fairly' willing to
move:
Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
to another neighbourhood 23 17 55 53
to another town or city 16 10 42 37
to another county 10 5 26 31
move outside country 12 15 18 27
move outside Europe 7 9 14 22
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
Noteworthy, that Latvians and Latvian Russians have a low willingness of mobility and it is
one of the reasons why they refer to migrants with strong distrust. The renewal of the Latvian nation
has also renewed the majority of Latvians at the national level; but in the largest cities Latvians are
still in the minority. Latvians often continue to conceive themselves as a minority. At the same time
Russians also conceive themselves as a minority. Feeling of insecurity impede integration of society
and formation of a common national identity in Latvia.
Language. One of the most important indicators that characterises the extent to which
immigrants have managed to integrate into a new culture and ethnic environment is the issue of
whether they have learned the local language. During the era of Soviet rule, Russian was the
unofficial state language and enjoyed special privileges compared to Latvian. In most places of
employment, it was not considered a drawback if a worker knew only Russian. At the same time, it
was practically impossible for a Latvian not to know Russian. The goal of the policy of Russification
was to create a linguistic segregation and asymmetrical bilinguality in the country. In practice this
meant one-sided bilingualism: everyone was expected to master Russian, but Russian-speakers did not
have to learn the language of the people among whom they were living6. As a result although the
population's ethnic composition is fragmented and very diverse, in terms of household languages
Latvia's residents fall into two groups - Latvian and Russian-speakers.
Only about one-half of the population knew Latvian and close to nine-tenths knew Russian.
Thus, the majority (approximately two-thirds) of Latvians were bilingual, but only 23% of non-
Latvians know Latvian in addition to another language7. The majority of non-citizens have not
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become integrated into Latvian society specifically because of the language barrier, and this is the
basis for divisions within our nation's population.
Analyses of the respondents in the survey shows that among the people who spent most of their
childhood in Latvia, 57% speak Latvian well, but among those who spent most of their childhood
elsewhere, only 36% do so. Only 12% of non-Latvians in Latvia have resided in the country for fewer
than 10 years, and 67% have lived here for more than 20 years. However, 65% of respondents from
the former group claim that they speak Latvian well, but only 47% of respondents in the latter group
feel the same. This reverse proportion is the result of the Soviet era, when the Russian language was
unofficially the state language in Latvia and was granted special privileges in comparison to the
Latvian language.
Limitations on the number of people who use Latvian language have led to a sharp reaction.
90% of Latvians say that one must speak Latvian language if one is to be a true resident of Latvia
(75% of non-Latvians agree). 19% of non-Latvians feel that it is not important to know Latvian
language. Hereto, this view is espoused to a relatively greater degree by two groups of people: non-
Latvians who are younger than 25 years of age (28%) and people who are poor or unemployed.
In 1988 the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR adopted a resolution which assigned state
language status to Latvian. In 1989 the Law on Languages of the Latvian SSR was adopted, declaring
Latvian the state language and outlining steps for renewing the functions of the state language. In
1992, amendments to the Law on Languages of the Latvian SSR reinforced Latvian as the sole state
language of Latvia. Operating under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, the State Language
Centre (SLC) and its certification committees and inspectorates provide for the implementation of
Latvian as the state language. The Academy of Sciences Terminology Commission provides
linguistically appropriate terminology for all professional fields. A new Draft Law on the State
Language has passed the first two readings in the Saeima (Parliament). In May 1998 the Cabinet of
Ministers approved the Ministry of Education and Science's (MES) Programme for gradual transition
to secondary education in the state language, and increase in the proportion of subjects taught in the
state language in the primary school curriculum.
Since the summer of 1995, the process of Latvian language proficiency testing has been
underway. There have also been changes in the Latvian labour law code permitting employers to lay
off employees who cannot fulfil their professional duties due to a lack of Latvian language
knowledge. However, there have been no reports of mass layoffs of employees lacking knowledge of
Latvian. There is also a State Language Inspection Board, whose duties include monitoring the
implementation of the Law on Languages.
In the past few years, knowledge of Latvian has become more widespread, but changes for the
better have been insufficient. Until now, the change in the status of Latvian has been more a coercive
than a voluntary process, and a more concerted effort is the necessity to inculcate Latvian language
skills. Poor knowledge of Latvian among non-citizens delays the integration process - about 20% of
non-citizens do not understand any Latvian, and 40% understand very little. We think that education
system could contribute to erasing differences in the initiative demonstrated by different groups.
Latvian must be taught not only to adults but also to students, schoolchildren, and perhaps most
effectively to children in non-Latvian kindergartens.
Bilingual education gives non-Latvians the opportunity to learn the Latvian language and
culture without losing their sense of ethnic affiliation. They gain a sense of belonging within the
Latvian nation, while maintaining their ethnic consciousness. The main assignment of bilingual
education at the primary school level is to prepare the student to receive further education in the state
language.
The acquisition of Latvian language skills will not only promote the integration of non-
Latvians, but provide them the opportunity to participate fully in the political, social, and economic
life of the country. As the number of Latvian language speakers grows, the consequences of Soviet
Russification policy will be overcome and Latvian fears about the survival of the language and culture
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in difficult demographic circumstances will dwindle.8 This will help to overcome linguistic
segregation and asymmetric bilingualism created by Soviet language policy, promote ethnic harmony,
and create basis for formation of a common national identity.
The very large number of non-Latvian speakers makes Latvian fluency a complex issue. Many
of them get by in daily life speaking Russian, and therefore lack the motivation to learn Latvian. In
many other places there is a lack of Latvian environment which would necessitate communication in
Latvian. Many non-Latvians do not speak Latvian and this creates opportunities for the Russian media
to manipulate the reader.
Sociolinguistic analyses demonstrates positive changes in attitudes toward learning Latvian
among non-Latvian youth; nevertheless, language-associated stereotypes change very slowly, and a
successful language mastery cannot be ensured without motivated teachers and pupils. This
motivation depends largely on stereotypes cultivated by the mass media and by relations between
ethnic groups.
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2. Latvian childhood memories
The study of children and ethnicity is an important subject for several reasons. Contemporary
social theories reflect a shift in the general understanding of the nature of ethnicity and ethnic groups.
Formerly seen as survival from an earlier age, which was supposed to be disappearing during the
transition towards modernity, now ethnicity is considered as a form of social life, which is capable of
renewing and transforming itself. The earlier idea of doing without ethnic groups in society, as
subgroups are assimilated to the majority group, has been as Utopian as the Marxian idea of doing
without social classes in society. Hunt and Walker argue that one of the paradoxical aspects of our
times is that, even as improvements in communication make a world community more conceivable,
and we develop more inclusive, or global identities, there are numerous ethnically based counter-
movements which divide-up existing states and multiply the number of groups trying to perpetuate
their national sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world9. These tendencies are particularly
salient in Eastern European countries where ethnicity is one of the core building blocks of new soc-
ieties during the present transformations10.
Children in Latvia, and in the Baltic states in general, are actually living in a situation of ethnic
revival and are facing controversial influences of growing ethnic self-awareness, an upsurge of
nationalism, migration processes, the formation of new social identities and patterns of intergroup
living. Another aspect which increases the role of the ethnic factor of children's socialization in
Latvia/Baltic states is the historically polyethnic composition of the population in these countries.
According to the census, 52% of the population of Latvia are Latvians. The rest are Russians,
Ukrainians, Belarussians, Poles, Jews and other minority groups. Children under the age of 15
constitute 1/5th of Latvia's population. About 20% of them are growing up in ethnically mixed
families, but many more are actually living in polyethnic social surroundings. The mode of children's
ethnic socialization today will determine the state of ethnic relations tomorrow.
However, several generations of people in Latvia have experienced childhood in ethnically
mixed surroundings and have developed models of intergroup living which stem from previous times,
but which are now functioning as norms in society. And last, but not least, the study of children's
ethnicity may promote our understanding of ethnic affairs in the "adult world", as well as contribute to
better understanding of the nature of ethnicity.
The material is sourced from the Latvian Archive of Ethnic Autobiographies. In 1991 the
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Latvian Academy of Sciences organized a nationwide
competition for ethnic life stories "Describe your nationality". People of all ethnic groups and ways of
life were encouraged through this prize competition to write their life stories focusing on those events
and reflections of the authors which were connected with their sense of ethnic belonging. The aim of
the project was to examine ethnicity through autobiographies, to collect, investigate and publish life
stories of people of different nationalities.
Combining an autobiographical approach11 with ethnosociology12 the project centered on the
questions: how ethnicity is experienced "from below", and what are the individual expressions and the
qualitative variety of ethnicity.
During the contest we received 329 autobiographies and obtained a valuable research material.
The total body of texts exceeds 3700 pages. The length of life stories varies from a few to more than a
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hundred pages. The cohort of authors represents the proportions of ethnic structure in Latvia - 53% of
life stories were submitted in Latvian, 47% in Russian. The minority groups - Ukrainians, Poles, Jews
and others were also well represented according to their proportions in the general structure of the
population. The minority groups' representatives wrote their stories in Latvian or Russian.
In general, the submitted stories differ: mosaic life recollections, life-course chronicles, literary
essays and even scientific treatises. The majority deals with ethnic problems as experienced in the
lives of the authors. These stories, personal recollections, could be labelled as ethnic autobiographies.
The criteria for choosing life stories were: i) extensiveness of childhood recollections; h) story
concentration on the author's personal childhood experiences connected with ethnicity; iii) nationality
of the authors so that different ethnic groups were represented in the material; iv) age of the authors so
that childhood memories of various generations were involved in the analysis.
Ethnic identity is related to other social identities. Children develop simultaneously a range of
identities just as they acquire a number of statuses and roles. Identity introduces the new dimension of
a child's self-perception. It represents the process by which he seeks to integrate his various roles, as
well as his diverse experiences into a coherent image of self 13. Snow and Anderson14 include in the
content of social identity self-esteem, self-perception, self-evaluation and self-concept. Researchers,
who have scrutinized social identities15, argue that they represent a set of meanings applied to self in a
social role situation and defining what it means to be who one is. Ethnicity is a kind of terminal
identity16 because it embraces and integrates a whole series of statuses, roles and lesser identities.
Ayalon H. et al17 argue that it has a dominant role in the individual's response to social contingencies.
As children have no developed set of social statuses and roles, ethnicity is an important channel of
socialization, a kind of complex identity.
Long before children start to label themselves as members of an ethnic group they are
becoming aware at the age of 4-5 of ethnic stimuli. Children's initial awareness of ethnicity is based
largely on obvious perceptual cues like language, distinctive customs, food, clothes, etc. As these cues
are perceived as natural in the child's surroundings, the first impressions of ethnicity usually evoke
through contacts with members of other groups. This awakes astonishment, curiosity or even
disbelief. Children suddenly reveal that some people are different. The first experience of ethnicity
depends on children's social cognition. Young children rely mainly on immediate information to
organize their experiences. They link new ethnic perceptions with their narrow experiences in the
physical and social world and make associations involving ethnic perceptions. Interethnic contacts,
perception of differences and comparisons are the ways in which children acquire the first ethnic stim-
uli.
Children's ethnic identification is formed earlier and more intensively in a polyethnic milieu
where they are exposed to group diversities. That pertains particularly to minority group children
who, in fact, have to acquire the norms, attitudes and behavior patterns of several groups. M.J.
Rotheram and J.S. Phinney18 point out two approaches to the analytic treatment of such situations. In
the first approach, conflict is seen as the most plausible result of intensive interethnic contacts.
Conflict is associated with children's increased emotionality, anxiety, hostility, insecurity,
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defensiveness, etc. The other approach is a synthesis approach in which children who have grown up
with tough ethnic contacts are seen as more adaptive and as possessing higher skills of social
communication. The analysis of life stories suggests that children in polyethnic milieus demonstrate
high flexibility, tolerance and abilities of cohesion.
Bilingualism is an example of how children obtain multicultural competence in a polyethnic
milieu. Adolescents more easily find ways of communication and surpass language barriers. However,
there are clues that when choosing their language of communication children rely on socially accepted
preferences.
Children's socialization in mono-ethnic milieus is quite different. Life-story analysis shows here
that ethnic identification where children lack intergroup contacts and perception of salient differences,
evolves more slowly and later, and is formed mainly through the acquiring of group values, habits,
way of life, etc. Later these in-group qualities are labeled as traits of ethnic belonging. The creation of
an affiliative bond with own-group by experiencing love, sense of commonality, trust, and core
solidarity to group values is the principle of forming children's ethnicity in mono-national
surroundings contrary to the experience of contacts and in-group out-group relations in polyethnic
milieus. Ethnic attitudes are children's ways of responding to their own and others ethnicity. The
analysis of life stories witnesses that children themselves are not the originators of either positive or
negative ethnic attitudes. Children initially learn attitudes and organised social predisposition from
adults. Early socialisation practices are critical to the determination of children's ethnic attitudes. If
they are linked with negativism, they can harm a child. Widespread among adults, such negative
evaluative concepts about particular groups as: poor, lazy, new-comers, inferiors,
backwards, may stimulate the formation of socially incorrect attitudes.
Although children's behavior usually responds to their identity and attitudes, the necessity to act
in concrete situations may cause discrepancies between behaviour and identity. Behaviour as a
finalising mutual relationship between ethnic self-identification, attitudes and social interactions may
reinforce certain ethnic meanings and the sense of group belonging if this relationship is congruent.
However, in many situations the link between children's self-identification, attitudes and conduct is
indirect. In such situations children are compelled to adjust their spontaneous reactions to social
norms or they may feel problems in confirming their identity.
I remember a winter day when we played snowballs. Then someone introduced the idea
"Latvians against Russians". I took it with pleasure because it was a possibility to affirm my
belonging to Latvia. But suddenly two of my friends stood on the opposite side. It came so
unexpectedly. I didn't know they were Russians. We never talked about that. But now I would have to
pelt them with snowballs. (Biography 320, Armins, born 1968, p.2.)
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3. National Identity
Belonging to Nation. The notion of national identity is a central in this project. In distinction
from identities that are based on ethnicity, territory, religion, culture, or social class, national identity
refers to an overall social and political organisation of a particular nation state (E. Gellner)19. It is
considered as a kind of summarising or ultimate identity and represents the process by which the
person seeks to integrate his various statuses and roles. National identity entails a notion of an 'other'
(B. Anderson)20. We know who we are because we know, or think we know, who we are not. This is
not, however, a sufficient condition of national identity. There must be some shared set of values or
beliefs. And, in this sense, the construction of national identity is a gradual process, taking place over
a long period of time. It is fragmented, constructed out of a variety of symbolic resources which can
be recovered, interpreted and mobilised. There are also different, often competing, tales to be told out
of the raw materials offered by history. It is this fragmented quality that makes national identity
'fuzzy' - with a boundary that is historically changing and often vague.
Latvia could be taken as the typical example of a mixed national identity: identity to one part of
society for the most part is based on jus soli, but to others identity for the most part is based on jus
sanguinis. One of the main reasons of such phenomenon is multiethnic composition of Latvia. The
other reason of such phenomena could be explained also by two large-scale migration flows (after
World War I to the East, and after World War II - to the West), which divided Latvians into West
Latvians, East Latvian and indigenous Latvians. During the restitution of state independence in the
Baltic states, national identity was a primary social force and source of solidarity. Ethnocentric period
represented a logical progression in the new self-construction of individual and national-collective
identity. But in the transition towards a democratic society ethnic identity as a value has to find
congruence with a broad spectrum of democratic values.
Some Western observers imagine society in Latvia as divided into two large groups: Latvians
and Russians and eliminate from account other nationalities. Another noteworthy point is that the
categories non-Latvians and non-citizens are not converging, but the observers sometimes forget
it. There are widespread opinion that minorities are the main losers of nation-building projects in
the post-Soviet borderlands, but facts not always correspond with this standpoint, especially if we
analyse situation of Jews, Poles and other national minorities21. Nissinen suppose that Russia prefers
homogenising the minority and referring to it as Russians in order to legitimise its interference in the
internal affairs of Latvia22.
Results drawn from research projects in the field of ethnic assimilation in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s indicated that Latvians and Russians were assimilating representatives of other, smaller
nationalities very intensively. Ethnonymy indexes (ethnonymy indexes speak to the frequency with
which individual nationalities are selected by representatives of the second generation emerging from
mixed marriages) declined between 1989 and 1998 - by 28.8% among second-generation offspring
from Russian-Polish marriages, by 27.7% among the offspring from Russian-Jewish marriages by
25.1% among the offspring of Russian-Lithuanian marriages23. This means that the national self-
identification of these nationalities has grown stronger but assimilation intensity decreased.
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Table 3.1. - Ethnonymy indexes in 1989 and 1998 (In 1989 the age of second-
generation offspring from mixed marriages who were studied was 16 - 26, while in
1998 it was 16 - 25)
Mixed marriages Ethnonymy indexes
Father          Mother 1989 1998
Russian         Polish 73.6 44.8
Russian         Lithuanian 66.8 41.7
Russian         Jewish 86.6 58.9
Source: Humanities and Social Sciences. Latvia, vol.3 (24), University of Latvia, Riga.1999, p.89
We could ask on what sort of grounds do Latvia inhabitants base national identity? There are
some obvious criteria (such as birth, citizenship, residence, cultural criteria like language and religion,
respect for laws and institutions and so on) as well as more diffuse ones such as the feeling of
'belonging' to a particular nation. But which matter most? And are there national differences in the
importance assigned to particular facets of identity? To assess this, we asked, for a range of different
criteria, how important or unimportant each was for being 'truly' Latvian. The next table shows the
proportion of people who said that a particular attribute was important in this respect (ISSP, National
Identity, 1995).
Table 3.2. - The importance of different factors in being 'truly' Latvian/ Norwegian/
Swedish
% 'very' or 'fairly' important': Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Born in country 73 57 62 52
Have citizenship 82 58 89 85
Lived most of life there 81 81 72 64
Able to speak language 92 80 96 96
Religion 36 31 21 18
Respect political institutions and laws 94 95 97 96
Feels Latvian, 'Swedish' etc. 96 96 91 88
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
We look first at the rank order of the different characteristics. We see that some national
differences exist in the importance given to different attributes in determining national identity. More
striking, however, is the relative similarity between countries in the emphasis that their populations
place upon these attributes. Birth, citizenship, residence, institutional respect, language and a
feeling of national identity are seen as important by clear majorities in all countries, and
considerable cross-national consensus exists with regard to the importance of the basic building
blocks that make up national identity.
The collective identity usually takes the form of a sense of community (community of certain
groups living on a certain territory or belonging to the same cultural environment). It is notable that
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Latvians, Norwegians and Swedes are alike in stressing the importance of being able to speak the
national language. These respondents think that citizenship is also an important aspect of national
identity. This approach corresponds with ideas of William James and George Herbert Mead, who
interpreted the identification as a process of naming, placing ourselves in socially constructed
categories, with language holding a central position in this process. Citizenship is more than a label.
He who has no sense of civic bond with his fellows or of some responsibility for civic welfare is no a
true citizen whatever his legal status. Identity and virtue invest the concept of citizenship with
power.24
The importance granted to religion as a source of national identity is higher evaluated in Latvia,
but we would like to note that around a third of the British evaluate importance of the religion in the
same way25. This is interesting, particularly given that the levels of religiosity in Latvia (as measured
by church attendance) are much lower than in western countries. We think that it may indicate that in
this context religion is marking cultural nationality, rather than religious practice.
Latvians place the greatest weight on having been born in the country. To assess this we asked
respondents to say how close they felt to a number of different territorial areas or may be none of
them (ISSP, National Identity, 1995). Are those who are highly attached to smaller areas within their
nation (such as a particular neighbourhood or region) more likely than average to be strongly attached
to their nation as well? Or does attachment to one's countrys national identity - occur only when
other territorial attachments are weak?
As the table shows, with the exception of Russian minority, the area to which the highest
proportion feel 'close' is the country within which they live. In all cases, except Norway, the lowest
level of attachment is felt for the largest geographical entity - Europe. At the same time we remember
Norwegians attitude to EU. We would like to note that only 22% of British respondents feel close
attachment to Europe26.
Table 3.3. - Feelings of attachment to different areas
% feel 'very' or 'fairly' close to: Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Neighbourhood 65 76 51 66
Town or city 83 91 70 67
County 72 69 80 68
Country 88 84 95 85
Europe 34 35 58 37
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
What is common to almost all definitions of place is that it is not only the relative location of
objects in the world or the broader frame of space, but also a reality that can be understood from the
perspective of people who have given it meaning. Places are not abstractions or concepts, but are
directly experienced phenomenon of the lived world and hence are full of meanings... They are
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important sources of individual and communal identity, and are often profound centres of human
existence to which people have deep emotional and psychological ties27. A place means an origin.
People actively constitute their place and their identity through their existential relations with their
environment. Home places are foundations of mans existence. They are the context of all human
activity as well as provide security and identity for the individual.
E. Relph analyses this phenomenon in terms of insideness-outsideness. The outsideness means
that all places for a person are of an equal meaningless identity. Places for him/her are not significant
centres of existence. Most people experience the insideness when they are at home and in their own
town or region where they know the place and its people and are known and accepted there. Persons
who have no places with which they identify themselves are in effect homeless, without roots. But
what is the situation in the case of a migrant, who has left one home behind as adult and encountered a
new one? In which one does migrant feel as visiting, in which one at home?
In Baltic Data House survey Towards a Civic Society (1507 citizens and 1502 non-citizens,
20 November 1997 till 9 January 1998) the following options were selected for measuring the
territorial sense of belonging: 1) closest neighbourhood, county, city borough, 2) city, 3) region, 4)
Latvia, 5) Russia, 6) Baltic States, 7) Europe.
As regards the sense of belonging to Latvia, city, Baltic States and Europe, the opinions of
citizens and non-citizens are quite similar. It should be noted that non-citizens, more often than
citizens, mentioned their sense of belonging to their closest neighbourhood (including the city
borough). Less often than citizens, non-citizens mentioned their sense of belonging to the region. The
sense of belonging to Russia was more often mentioned by non-citizens (20%) as well as citizens-
Russians (14%), least of all by citizens-Latvians (2%).
Data of the survey Towards a Civic Society also demonstrate the understanding of the notion
homeland in different groups of population. 12% of non-citizens mentioned Russia as their
homeland, 9% named some of the former republics of the USSR, 10% - the former Soviet Union and
only 58% of non-citizens named Latvia as homeland (95% of citizens mentioned Latvia as their
homeland). The former Soviet Union and Russia were more often mentioned as homeland by older
people, especially over 60, as well as people with higher education. Among non-citizens, Latvia was
named as homeland more often by younger people (in the age group below the age of 30 - 69%). But
we must note that attitude of Russians toward Latvia as homeland has changed very strongly, because
in November 1991 after Latvia has restored independence, only 29% of Russian respondents stated
that they considered Latvia to be their "homeland", 15% chose Russia, 27% the Soviet Union, and
29% responded that it was "difficult to say"28.
Dzintra Bungs thinks that under Soviet rule, the Russian-speakers developed a kind of
supranational, political identity linked to Communist ideology. For most Russian-speakers
independence meant insecurity and a loss of political identity and privilages29. As noted R.Karklins,
"In Latvia national identification has been simplest for Latvians. Living in their traditional homeland
and able to use their language - although in limited way - most Latvians have had little difficulty
identifying themselves as Latvians Self identification and identification of others was more
complicated for non-Latvians. The more difficult problem has been that the break-up of the USSR
not only create new states and regimes, but also left behind a resentful subgroup of people in Latvia
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and elsewhere that identifies with the old state and the old regime. The Soviets without the Soviet
Union present a source of political instability"30.
We could conclude that migrants have experienced two places and given meanings to them. In
our everyday life we may be unaware of the psychological, emotional and existential ties we have to
the places. But in the case of migrants this awareness is stronger because the attachment to place
becomes aware from spatial and temporal distance. In the case of migrants we can talk about polarity
between home and away, taking into account that there may be no return home.
The sense of belonging to one's country, on the emotional level can be also characterised by the
feelings of pride about it. To evaluate sense of feelings of pride respondents were asked to answer to
question To what extent are you proud of being a Latvian inhabitant? (survey Towards a Civic
Society). 82% of citizens-Latvians and 59% of citizens-Russians feel more or less proud about
belonging to Latvia (41% of citizens are very proud about belonging to Latvia). Non-citizens more
often gave the answer "rather proud" (36%) than "very proud" (16%). In we analyse the feelings of
pride about one's nationality, we can see that 84% of Latvians and 64% of non-citizens are proud
about their nationality (only 38% - very proud and 26% - to a certain extent).
National proud was evaluated also by two other indicators (ISSP, National Identity, 1995). 39%
of Latvians and 36% of Russians agreed strongly to the statement There are some things about
Latvia today that make me feel ashamed (the same answer gave 10% of Norwegians and 26% of
Swedes about their countries). At the same time respondents evaluated the statement: I would rather
be a citizen of Latvia (Sweden, Norway) than of any other country in the world. 56% of Latvians
strongly agreed with this statement (46% of Norwegians, 40% of Swedes and 39% of Russians).
We would like to note that many Latvians feel ashamed of certain aspects of Latvia, but at the
same time they demonstrate high level of patriotism. We investigated a series of statements about
national pride (ISSP, National Identity, 1995). The highest levels of pride in Latvia are reserved for
the country's arts ad sports achievements. The Latvians highly evaluate their past, but very low they
evaluate our social security system and economic achievements. As the next table shows, the highest
levels of national pride are found in Nordic countries, and the lowest in Latvia. For this reason we
think that fears about excessive nationalism in Latvia are not well grounded.
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Table 3.4. - Pride about national achievements and institutions
% 'very' or 'somewhat' proud : Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Arts and literature 86 83 75 73
Sports achievements 79 72 91 84
History 73 66 80 68
Scientific achievements 53 40 81 86
Way democracy works 44 29 80 64
Political influence in world 41 34 78 41
Fair and equal treatment of groups in society 31 24 45 42
Armed forces 28 19 43 33
Economic achievements 23 18 80 16
Social security system 13 10 61 64
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
Survey Towards a Civic Society also investigated willingness of citizens and non-citizens to
defend Latvia in the event of an armed conflict. When interpreting answers to this question, it should
be noted that the proposed situation was imaginary, without describing specific conditions and the
causes of the eventual conflict. In a real situation the actual behaviour of the people could be different.
The answers of the respondents show that, in the event of an armed conflict with Russia, 77%
of the Latvian citizens would take sides with Latvia (Latvians: 86%; citizens-Russians: 36%), 11% of
Latvians would take a neutral position (the remaining 3% of Latvians could not give a definite
answer). 48% of citizens-Russians said that they would take a neutral position.
About one half of all non-citizens would take a neutral position (51%); 24% would side with
Latvia, 5% -- with Russia, and 21% could not answer. Among those non-citizens who said that they
would defend Latvia, there were more often people aged 40 - 60 (26%); with lower incomes (28%),
people from the countryside (33%), people with primary and secondary education (28%). Younger
people more often than other decided to take the side of Russia (7%), just like wealthier non-citizens
(7%). Similarly, younger people and people with higher incomes were those who would be more
tended to take a neutral position (56%). People in the age group of 30 - 40, country people and people
with higher education (25%) were the most uncertain about their position. Noteworthy that in 1993
only 15% of Russians supported withdrawing the Russian army from Latvia31.
Russia increasingly sought special rights throughout the former USSR, pretexting by the
defence of the rights of Russians that remained beyond its new borders. Russia claimed the role of
defender of the rights of all non-Latvians (Russian-speakers) in Latvia, including not only Russians,
but also Ukrainians, Belarussians and other groups that had undergone intensive russification during
Soviet times. In the survey National Identity the respondents were asked how much they agreed or
disagreed with two statements: It is essential that respondents country remains one nation/state and
Parts of respondents country should be allowed to become fully separate nation/state if they choose
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to. We can see that about one third of Russians did not support integrity of Latvia and for this reason
many Latvians evaluated Russians as disloyal and dangerous.
Table 3.5. - How much you agree or disagree with the two following statements (%):
Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
It is essential that respondents country
remains one nation/state
92 64 95 91
Parts of respondents country should be
allowed to become fully separate
nation/state if they choose to
8 36 5 9
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, Russians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
The idea of the eventual joining of Latvia to Russia as a part of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) was supported by 6% of citizens-Latvians, 26% of citizens-Russians and
35% of non-citizens (the survey Towards a Civic Society). It was more often supported by younger,
poorer and respondents with lower education. The idea of Latvia joining the CIS was more seldom
supported by non-citizens with higher incomes and with higher education. Every fifth non-citizen was
unable to answer to this question.
80% of Latvians, 55% of citizens-Russians and 56% of non-citizens believed that Latvia will
never join Russia. 6% of Latvians, 19% of citizens-Russians and 20% of non-citizens thought that it
would happen in the future sooner or later. This opinion was more often supported by persons with
lower incomes and with lower education. The respondents with higher incomes and with higher
educational levels more often supported the opposite view: that Latvia will never again join Russia.
In assessing attitudes toward state, the question of sovereignty and independence is crucial. If
we compare the results of the surveys conducted in 1991, 1994 and 1997 (Baltic Data House surveys),
we can see that the proportions of non-Latvians who believe that Latvia will join to Russia did not
change during this time (18% in 1991, 16% in 1994 and 20% in 1997), the proportion of non-Latvians
who think that Latvia will be an independent state increased (35% in 1991, 53% in 1994 and 56% in
1997), but the proportion of undecided decreased (43% in 1991, 27% in 1994 and 20% in 1997)32. We
must note that in June 1989 independence of Latvia was supported by 9% of non-Latvians, but in June
1990 - by 26%33.
Moving to a new place can be a threat to many central things in mans existence, the whole
identity may be threatened. On the contrary, leaving to other country may mark satisfaction of the
need for change and the start of a new life. Then a new place can become a real home. The migrant
changes not only place, but also the social and cultural environment. The experiences of two homes,
two countries have to be conciliated. On the subject of these attitudes, D.Seamon has written:
'Migrants have to become free of their old world yet use it as a foundation. They have to open
themselves to the new place and its symbols"34.
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Table 3.6. - Attitudes towards ethnic minority culture (%)
% agree: Latvians non-Latvians Norwegians Swedes
Different cultures can't become
fully national
77 65 67 61
Government aid to preserve ethnic
minority culture
61 82 20 19
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, non-Latvians r=317; Norway: r = 1527,
Norwegians r=1460; Sweden: r=1294, Swedes r=1201)
Survey data show that Latvians more frequently than non-Latvians think that different cultures
cannot become fully national . At the same time we must point out that a high proportion of
Latvians think that 'ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to help preserve their
customs and traditions'. Nordic respondents demonstrate less willingness to support cultures of the
minorities than nationalistic Latvians.
Networks and Inter-Ethnic Relations. The network analysis should be seen as a complement
to the traditional research focusing on individual actors, social norms and institutions35. An adequate
view of social reality can be gained only by considering systematically both of these aspects - the
individual actors and their interests and resources, and the patterns of relationships in which they are
embedded. It is a common sociological assumption that in the course of modernisation of societies a
significant shift takes place from kin relationships and local community ties to more individualised
social networks chosen more or less freely on other bases (common values, common occupation or
leisure-time interests etc). This shift implies a higher freedom for individuals in choosing their
partners and social relationships: as well relations to extended kin can be chosen more freely today. At
the same time the enlarged freedom implies also a higher burden of individual decisions and a higher
risk of break-up of relationships.
The concept of networks claims to cover the totality of all forms of social relations and refers to
individuals (or more rarely groups and roles) that are linked together by one or more social
relationships, thus forming a social network. Examples of relationship links include kinship,
communication, friendship and different forms of weak ties (which are not necessarily characterised
by high levels of intensity and intimacy).
Inter-ethnic networks could be analysed from various points of view (as strong or weak ties; the
shape and form of flows within the networks, etc.) based on different theoretical approaches (a
rational choice theory, conflict theory, etc.). In our survey we tried: to compare the respondents
opinion about typical traits of Latvians and non Latvians; to describe the typical structure of inter-
ethnic networks; to investigate respondents attitude to inter-ethnic relations in Latvia and to analyse
some of the causes and consequences of different patterns of inter-ethnic networks.
Stereotypes are commonly held and lead to perception and treatment of individuals according
to unjustified preconceptions. We suppose that analyses of ethnic stereotypes and prejudices which
characterise simplistic generalisation about a group of individuals that enables others to categorise
members of the group and treat them routinely according to these expectations, can help to explain
why ethnic networks are maintained and allow to investigate the preconditions for their changes.
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In survey Towards a Civic Society respondents were asked to evaluate what traits were most
often observed in Latvians. Russians characterised Latvians as cultural, educated (49%), hardworking
(46%), hospitable (39%), peaceful (35%), reserved (35%), patient (33%), religious (32%),
independent (31%) (eight most often mentioned). At the same time, Latvians described Russians as
hospitable (56%), men of action (51%), hardworking (49%), ready to help (49%), open, simple
(41%), imposing their habits (34%), eager for power (33%) and lazy (30%).
Latvians characterise themselves as hardworking (59%), patient (56%), cultural, educated
(54%), reserved (49%), resistant (44%), peaceful (39%), hospitable (36%). Comparing self-evaluation
of Latvians and evaluation of the most often observed traits in Latvians by Russians, it must be
noticed that remarkable differences were found only in 5 traits of 28 enumerated: Latvians
characterise themselves as more patient, reserved, resistant and hardworking than Russians evaluate
them and, on the other hand, Russians evaluate Latvians as more independent than they think about
themselves (31% and 19% respectively).
On the contrary, valuation of Russians by themselves and by Latvians does not correspond in
almost half of the traits. For the most part Latvians appraise lower positive traits of Russians (such as
simple, peaceful, patient, cultural and educated, hardworking) and more often mark negative features
(lazy, eager for power, imposing their habits). At the same time Latvians do not agree with Russians
that they are forgotten and humiliated (Latvians - 4%, Russians - 12%).
In comparison with the data of 1993 survey36, the more critical attitude of Latvians toward
Russians has not changed. There was only one trait of Russians, which was evaluated higher by
Latvians than by Russians themselves - sincere (Latvians - 80%, Russians - 58%). Noteworthy that at
that time attitude of Latvians toward themselves was more critique - Russians were more favourable
in characterising Latvians by three pairs of opposite traits of seven mentioned (pushing -
unenterprising; harmonious - spiky; sincere - cool).
Analogous data was received during the Baltic Barometer II survey37. 20% of Latvians felt that
they had nothing in common with Russians (29% - not much, 38% - some things, and 9% - a lot),
while only 5% of Russians said that they had nothing in common with Latvians (17% - not much,
49% - some things, 24% - a lot). Similar results were also obtained investigating the mutual
perceptions of the inhabitants of Estonia - Estonians and Russians38 and in the survey Nationalities in
the Baltic States39. All these figures indicate that a large part of Latvians does not recede from
primitive ethnic stereotypes and this phenomenon could create a serious obstacle for communication
between these communities.
Seven levels of preferred closeness of communications among Latvians and Russians were
proposed in the surveys Towards a Civic Society questionnaire: "up to becoming close relatives",
"as with a good friend", "as a neighbour", "as a colleague at work", "as a permanent resident of the
country", "as a tourist", "may not be even allowed to enter the country". Survey data show that non-
Latvians, more often than Latvians, would be ready to establish close relations as relatives or relations
as between good friends with persons of other nationalities. Close relations as far as kinship with
Latvians accept 58% of Russians, and as far as close friendship - 25%.
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Only 18% of Latvians admit close relations up to becoming close relatives with Russians, but
as far as friendship - 19%. So we can conclude, that Latvians and Russians have different attitudes
towards interpersonal relations: Russians would more often be ready to permit familiar, friendly
relations with Latvians than Latvians in relation to Russians. Data of 1993 survey40 aver that 55% of
Latvians would respond positively and 29% would be neutral if their family member had a close
friend of other nationality. Russians are more open - 59% would react positively and 37% would be
neutral.
Survey data show (the survey Towards a Civic Society) that the Russian parents would
generally not object to their children choosing a Latvian spouse (only 1% of Russians would be
against that). However, 30% of Latvians would object to his/her child marrying a Russian. Similarly,
32% of Latvians would object to their child marrying a Jew, while 13% of Russians would object to
such marriage. Survey of 1993 comes up with analogous data41: only 2% of Russians and 31% of
Latvians objected to marriage of their family member with a person of other nationality.
At the same time we must note that in 1996, 34% of all marriages were ethnically mixed,
ranging from approximately 18% for Latvians (in 1998 19.9%) to about 90% for Belarussians,
Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians. About 20% of non-citizen respondents and citizens-Russians have
Latvian spouses, and 10% of citizens-Latvians have Russian spouses. These married couples mainly
communicate in Russian (the survey Towards a Civic Society). Taking into account the very large
number of mixed marriages, many people in Latvia have an affinity with more than one ethnic group.
As a result, in Latvia ethnicity quite often does not coincide with other ethnodemographic indicators,
particularly native language. According to the 1989 census (where ethnicity was not recorded from
passport entries, but was self-reported by respondents), the native language of 10% of the population
of Latvia was different from their ethnicity. According to the Population Register, in 1997 over
120,000 people in Latvia used two languages at home. The reasons of this phenomenon can be
explained by a high level of ethnically mixed marriages in Latvia.
Sociological survey data also indicate that communication between the ethnic groups is rather
intensive (including contacts between friends, colleagues at work and relatives). According to the
survey Towards a Civic Society data, 68% of Latvians have Russian friends and acquaintances. On
the other hand, 90% of non-citizens have Latvian friends and acquaintances. The situation is similar at
work. However only 6% of those who have Latvian colleagues speak Latvian at work, 17% speak
more Latvian than Russian, while 76% speak more or only Russian.
Different surveys indicate that Latvians feel a greater distance towards people of other groups,
as compared with Russians. But we could remember that the persons of Northern Europe - British,
Scandinavians - usually try to keep greater distance in the communication process, while, for
example, Italians, Russians and French prefer lesser social distance. These distinctions correspond
with American anthropologist Edward Hall explanations42. We must note that the communication
networks of Latvian inhabitants are most often closed within the circle of their families, friends.
Responding to the question (the survey Towards a Civic Society) who could render the most
reliable support if necessary, most of Latvians and Russians (equally 63%) mentioned relatives and
much less - friends (16% and 17%, respectively). As the Latvian community is small, the
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interpersonal links often stem from early childhood so that there are strong bonds between Latvians. It
is not easy for outsiders to enter a cohesive society where everybody knows everybody43.
If we analyse inter-ethnic relations in Latvia we must note that 68% of Latvians and 62% of
Russians evaluate inter-ethnic relations as satisfactory. 18% of Latvians and 21% of Russians assess
these relations as good, but 10% of Latvians and 12% of Russians evaluated inter-ethnic relations as
bad. If we compare the results of the surveys conducted in 1993, 1995 and 1997, we can see that the
evaluation of inter-ethnic relations has not changed seriously during this time. In 1993 62% of
Latvians and the same number of non-Latvians evaluated relations between nationalities as good44.
15% of Latvians and 19% of Russians thought that forcible ethnic conflicts were possible in Latvia,
while considerably more respondents (53% of Latvians, 74% of Russians) believed that ethnic
congruity between Latvians and non-Latvians was possible. In 1995 62% of Latvians and 68% of
non-Latvians stated: "All right, we can handle whatever problems between nationalities arise"45.
Asked to compare the inter-ethnic relations as they exist now with those that existed before the
restoration of independence, 49% of citizens and 45% of non-citizens evaluated relations as the same,
39% of non-citizens and 28% of citizens said that they had worsen, but 23% of citizens and 16% of
non-citizens assessed inter-ethnic relations as better. However, looking into future, 47% of citizens
and 52% of non-citizens expected that these relations would improve within the next five years, 47%
of citizens and 40% non-citizens believed that relations would be the same, and only 6% of citizens
and 8% of non-citizens thought that relations would be worse (the survey Towards a Civic Society).
We must note serious changes of these expectations. Only some years ago, 10% of Latvians
and the same number of Russians thought that conflicts between Latvians and Russians living here
were definitely threat to peace and security in this country, but 36% of Latvians and 24% of non-
Latvians answered - probably46. At the same time 46% of Russians concerned that the rights of their
nationality could be restricted.
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4. Regime identity
The interactive relationship between state and nation is complicated because national and ethnic
identity is based both on tangible communal traits and on a psychological sense of community47. In
this chapter we shall try to analyse the way in which the relationship between people and political
systems is changing, and how the nature of these relations can affect the operational strategies of
those who are engaging in activities, the civil society and, by extension, the development of
democracy and identity formation. Normally it is difficult to study the interaction between
institutional and cultural change, but recent shifts in the form of regimes in Eastern Europe have
created new opportunities to study the congruence between the system and the self. In analysing the
positioning of individuals, we shall first of all analyse the distinction between those who are
established and those who are outsiders, and between those who have access to material and non-
material resources of power and those who are distanced from these resources.
In our survey we tried: to investigate non-citizens attitude toward citizenship; links between
development of market economy in Latvia and identity formation; participation of individuals in the
social and political processes of society; problem of alienation. We suppose that this analyses can help
to understand state and regime identity formation process in Latvia and allows to apprehend possible
risks of the development of civic society and democracy in Latvia.
Citizenship. One of Latvia's most important future domestic policy tasks is resolving issues
related to the large number of non-citizens in the country. "How could the independent and
democratic state of Latvia give citizenship to people who had actively fought against her
independence and democratic regime? The main issue became what to do with "Soviets" without the
Soviet Union"48. The situation is exacerbated by the large number of resident non-citizens and the
slow naturalisation process.
In accordance with the 4 May 1990 Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR on
the Renewal of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia and the Latvian SSR Supreme Council's
21 August 1991 Constitutional Law On the Republic of Latvia Status as a Sovereign State, Latvia was
recognised as an independent, democratic republic and the 15 February 1922 Constitution of the
Republic of Latvia was reinstated within the territory of Latvia. On restoring statehood, it was
necessary to define the citizenry of the Republic of Latvia. Therefore, on 15 October 1991 the Latvian
Supreme Council adopted the resolution For Renewing Citizen Rights and Setting the Conditions for
Naturalisation. This resolution declared null and void from the moment of its adoption the USSR
Supreme Soviet's 7 September 1940 Decree On the Order in Which the Citizens of the Lithuanian,
Latvian, and Estonian SSR Receive USSR Citizenship. It also declared that the Republic of Latvia
acknowledges the citizenship of persons who were Latvian citizens on 17 June 1940, and of their
descendants, provided that they register at the Republic of Latvia Registry of Residents before the
given deadline. In addition to this, other normative acts were adopted to regulate citizenship-related
issues, but it was necessary to adopt a normative act that would define the status of citizens, the terms
for acquiring and losing Latvian citizenship, the states relationship with its citizens and so forth. Thus
on 22 July 1994 the Saeima (Parliament) adopted the Law on Citizenship, which was signed by
President Ulmanis on 11 August 1994. The Law took effect on 25 August 1994. Modifications to the
Law on Citizenship were made in 1995, 1997 and 1998.
According to the Law on Citizenship adopted in summer 1994, a large portion of the remaining
inhabitants of Latvia may qualify for citizenship through naturalisation. Although the citizenship law
engendered tremendous controversy, the requirements set up to citizenship candidates are finally
clear.
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According to the latest data of the Citizenship and Migration Affairs Board (CMAB), of the
2,434,000 residents of Latvia, approximately 646,000 (26%) are non-citizens.
According to the Law on Citizenship 148,000 persons had the right to apply for citizenship.
Between February 1995 and 31 August 1998, only 11 200 applications were received, and citizenship
was granted to 10 262 persons by the orders of the Cabinet of Ministers.
Table 4.1. - Latvias residents according to ethnicity and citizenship








Latvian 1,381,674 8,536 557,000 1,290,767
Russian 289,432 429,272 10,291 728,995
Belarussian 21,133 79,783 1,023,000 101,939
Polish 39,205 22,083 447,000 61,735
Lithuanian 13,518 20,008 965,000 34,491
Ukrainian 4,876 59,763 1,788 66,427
Other 20,517 27,278 2,320 50,115
Total 1,770,355 646,723 17,391 2,434,469
Source: Citizenship and Migration Affairs Board, 8 January 1998
There are some explanations of this phenomenon:
 many people are ill-informed and have little interest in their options and rights to gain
Latvian citizenship;
 naturalisation is treated and perceived only as a formal act, and people do not link it with the
broader process of integration;
 in all post-socialist countries, among both - citizens and non-citizens, there is a considerable
passivity and alienation from the political, economic, and social life, from government
institutions, and in relations between groups.
The fact that non-citizens are by no means beating down the doors to obtain citizenship allows
us to come to a fundamental conclusion: it turns out that the advantages that are afforded by Latvian
citizenship do not compensate for the inconveniences that are involved in obtaining it. Naturalisation
also keeps people from enjoying some of the advantages which non-citizens have, including the right
to enter several ex-Soviet republics without a visa. When they accept Latvian citizenship, these
possibilities disappear. Some young people do not feel that citizenship makes a difference in their
ability to exercise their rights. They think that without Latvian citizenship, they can still obtain an
education and a job, as well as equal wages. At the same time, a great part of young non-citizens
admits that citizenship will be an important issue in terms of their future career.
The lack of interest in naturalization was investigated in different surveys. The results of
studies by the Naturalization Board suggest that the major obstacles to more active naturalization
might be the following: 1) Inadequate knowledge of the Latvian language and history. 26% of the
pupils admitted that they did not know the history of Latvia or the Constitution, the same proportion
thought that their knowledge of Latvian was inadequate. Only one in ten from this group reported
being able to write and speak Latvian freely. 2) Young male non-citizens do not wish to serve in the
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Latvian army; as opposed to their citizen peers who must do military service, non-citizens can enroll
in university immediately after secondary school. 3) Non-citizens - USSR passport holders - may
travel to Russia without visas, as opposed to Latvian citizens who require visas. 4) Lack of interest in
obtaining Latvian citizenship, an inadequate valuation of political rights. 5) Lack of information on
the requirements of the law. These conclusions strongly correspond with our data received in
sociological surveys. We must only note that young women do not have to serve in the army, but they
also had not demonstrated great interest in undergoing naturalization. Moreover, USSR passports will
soon become invalid. Therefore, these factors cannot be decisive in the slow pace of naturalization.
Only 27% of young non-citizens (15 - 30 years old), eligible for applying for citizenship, are
planning to use this opportunity, but 49% do not plan to do it, while the rest are not able to render a
definite answer (the survey Towards a Civic Society). The most often cited reasons why the
younger people do not plan to apply for the Latvian citizenship, are the following: inability to pass the
Latvian language (40%) and history examinations (43%), as well as lack of information (38%). 33%
young persons stated that naturalisation was humiliating. 26% of young non-citizens explained his or
her unwillingness to apply for citizenship because they did not see the necessity for Latvian
citizenship, 23% answered that they did not feel belonging to the Latvian State, and 25% that it was
not important to vote in elections, but 24% did not wish to serve in the Latvian Army. Less often, the
respondents said that it was more difficult for citizens to travel to Russia. We can conclude that all
these persons are very seriously alienated from the state.
83% of the young persons, who plan to become citizens of the Republic of Latvia in the future,
state that they wish to belonging to this country and believe that it would be better for their
children. 72% of them hope that, by acquiring the Latvian citizenship, it will become easier for them
tot find a job and 76% think that they will feel safer. 61% consider that they will have better
opportunities to participate in the privatisation process and in obtaining ownership of land. 52% of
them are interested to gain political rights and to take part in elections, but 49% think, that it would
be easier to go abroad.
Strongly well disposed for applying the citizenship are non-citizens who are older than 30
years. 67% of them plan to apply for the citizenship of Latvia in the future, 18% do not plan to apply,
while the remaining 15% do not yet have a clear opinion on this issue. Those who plan to apply for
citizenship of Latvia in the future (in the age group over 30) would like to do it, because they wish to
feel belonging to the Latvian State (93%), it would allow them to feel safer, more confident (85%);
the Latvian State will protect them more, if they are citizens (78%), it would be better for their
children (80%). 70% of non-citizens who wish to acquire the Latvian citizenship would like to take
part in elections of parliament and local governments. 52% of the respondents in this group hope that
the status of citizen will allow him or her to have better access to jobs, but 53% think that citizenship
would help them to participate in the privatisation process.
The major reasons for unwillingness to apply citizenship are the same as mentioned by young
respondents. 57% of the respondents of this group think that they cannot pass the Latvian language
examination, 37% do not see any need for the Latvian citizenship, 34% think that naturalisation is
humiliating, but 25% have no interest to take part in elections. 19% answered that they do not feel as
belonging to the Latvian state, but only 5% wish to apply for the citizenship of some other country,
and the same percentage already have the citizenship of some other country.
Interpretation of the attitude towards the Latvian state and its role in the naturalisation process
divides citizens and non-citizens: 66% of non-citizens think that the state is not interested in resolving
the problem of non-citizens (this opinion is supported by 39% of citizens). On the other hand, the
view that non-citizens are reluctant to apply for citizenship because of their negative attitude towards
the Latvian state is more popular among citizens (58%). This statement is accepted also by 25% of
non-citizens. Citizens and non-citizens also divide by their interpretation of this phenomenon: 65% of
citizens think that non-citizens do not feel a necessity for the Latvian citizenship (this view is
supported by 40% non-citizens!!!), on the other hand, 35% of non-citizen think that the negative
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attitude of citizens hinders the pace of naturalisation. The interpretation of the naturalisation
requirements also is sharply differing between citizens and non-citizens: half of all non-citizens (51%)
regards these requirements as unfair, while only every fifth of citizens (19%) supports this view.
These data suggest that there is a dissent between citizens and non-citizens based on the
negative interpretation of the attitudes of the other side; it should be noted that this contrariety is
further reinforced by the negative interpretation of the role of the state on the issue of citizenship
including the negative interpretation of naturalisation requirements by non-citizens.
At the same time, survey data demonstrate that 72% of non-citizens would like their children to
become citizens of Latvia, and 9% of non-citizens answered "rather yes". Only 5% have rendered
negative answer to this question, while others (14%) could not give a definite answer. These data
suggest that, in the future prospective, most of non-citizens link their and their children's future with
Latvia.
We can conclude that unwillingness to learn language, unwillingness to undertake the duties of
the citizen and alienation from the state are the major reasons which impede non-citizens to acquire
the Latvian citizenship, but at the same time, most of non-citizens link their children's future with
Latvia.
Development of Market Economy and Identity Formation. In the late 1980s, when political
changes were beginning in Latvia, most of the countrys residents believed that market economy
would promote their welfare. The result of various structural changes, however, has been a serious
deterioration in the standard of living of many inhabitants. Purchasing power has decreased, as has the
ability to receive medical services and a free education. The opportunities of social protection have
become more limited, while unemployment and crime are on the rise. Baltic population finds many
discrepancies between the state in which they live and the state of which they dream and have certain
expectations. There is grumbling and frustration both among the citizens and non-citizens49.
Accordingly, many residents feel disappointed, because they have not obtained any tangible benefits
from the changes, while their already low level of welfare continues to be under constant threat.
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Figure 4.1. - Benefits from the changes
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Source: Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, September 1998
If we use the crisis survival minimum that is set by the Ministry of Welfare (94 USD per month
in 1996), we find that approximately two-thirds of the Latvian population are living in poverty.50
Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas and small towns. Particularly vulnerable to poverty are those
households in which there are three or more children. This may seem a paradox, given the low level
of pensions in Latvia (monthly average amount of old-age pensions was approximately 70 USD in
1997), but the presence of a pensioner in the household often keeps the household from sinking into
deep poverty, because pensions, no matter how small, are still a regular source of income 51.
We cannot really say that Latvia is a winner-take-all society, but the transition from the very
egalitarian society that existed in Latvia under conditions of socialism to a society in which there is an
enormous level of income differentiation (in 1998 the Gini coefficient in Latvia was 0.32), has caused
psychological discomfort in those residents whose standard of living has deteriorated over the last
decade. It must be taken into account that Latvias residents came into contact with poverty and
inequality only at the beginning of the 1990s, and inevitably there are people who compare their
present-day welfare with the quality of life during the Soviet era. The political system of the socialist
period limited the political rights of individuals, but it did allow inhabitants to satisfy their basic
economic needs.
The bulk of the communists supporters consists of the poor old age pensioners who are
yearning for the good old days. They would like to restore the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet
system in economy and politics. Many of them really believe in communism deep in their heart. Now
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they are following the progress of the communists in Russia watchfully. Typically, the aggressive
section of the Russian-speakers tends to be the most vocal group52.
Figure 4.2. - GDP per capita (1990  1997)
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Most respondents in Latvia think that people are poor in the country because society treats them
unfairly, not because people are lazy or void of ambition. In this sense the attitudes of Latvias
respondents are similar to those that prevail among the inhabitants of Scandinavian countries53.
As a result large part of Latvian population supports economic protectionism because they hope
that such policy corresponds with Latvias labour market needs and allows to protect countrys
economic independence.
Table 4.2. - Economic protectionism
% agree: Latvians Russians Norwegians Swedes
Our country should limit the import
of foreign products in order to protect
national economy
79 71 41 44
Foreigners should not be allowed
to buy land in our country
71 69 40 37
Source: International Social Survey Programme, module Role of Government, 1996
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The residents of East Europe have now won political freedoms, but these cannot be used to
make individual lives safer or better provided. Accordingly, Latvian population tends to evaluate most
critically the development of its country as well as the development of democracy. 37% of
respondents feel that things are going in the wrong direction (as opposed to 45% who think that
things are going in the right direction). Only 24% of respondents are satisfied with the way in which
democracy is developing in Latvia (69% are not satisfied)54.
In economically developed countries where economic welfare has led to an unprecedented level
of economic security there is an increasing rejection of those values that were created by poverty
because now most people believe that their survival is guaranteed. This guarantee has come to be
understood so automatically that people do not really perceive the extent to which it affects their
world view. Inglehart has suggested that the publics basic value priorities are determined by a
scarcity hypothesis: individuals place the greatest value on things that are in relatively short supply,
and an individuals basic value priorities are formed as a reaction to socio-economic conditions. In
West Europe, most people are worried not about their economic security, but rather about non-
material benefits and the quality of life. Security values are conducive to tolerance; this is the
converse of the fact that insecurity is conducive to xenophobia55. Tolerance, for its part, is a key
element in democracy. The narrower the limits of survival, the more likely that outsiders will be
perceived as a threat to survival.
That is why in East Europe where economic and political systems have collapsed completely,
ethnic conflicts can be so powerful. No culture is immune to xenophobia, but it tends to be most
intense at times and places where insecurity is most severe (ibid.). From this perspective and taking
into account the complex ethnic constitution of the Baltic States, we can assume that in the presence
of an ongoing high level of poverty, the achievement of social harmony in the region may be
problematic.
Participation. The participation of individuals in the social and political processes of society is
a guarantee of the stability of the respective countrys political system, and it is of particularly great
importance in conditions when the self-control of a country is weak. At the same time, participation is
one of the main conditions for solidarity among individuals and groups, as well as for the
development of individual self-respect.
Participation can be realised in a variety of ways  people can vote in elections, become
members of various organisations, participate in the development or implementation of political
decisions, become active in self-help processes, or become involved in the religious or cultural life of
a community. In the parliamentary elections that Latvia held in 1998, the voter turnout was 78%,
while in the 1995 local government elections turnout was lower  57%. Compared to other East
European countries, these are fairly high indicators. The involvement of Latvias residents in labour
unions, by contrast, is much lower. The largest labour organisation in Latvia  the Latvian
Association of Free Labour Unions  has 258,000 members or 30% of those who are employed.
Even smaller number of people is involved in activities of a regular nature. Survey responses
show that a comparatively small share of Latvian population (some 40%) agree with the statement,
The best way for people like me to get ahead is to co-operate with others in this community to
promote common interests56. This means that the potential for participation, generally speaking, is
not very high. Often participation can be hampered by a lack of money or time, because the poor have
limited opportunities to participate in any activity that does not yield immediate material benefit for
themselves or for their families. The maintenance of a political and social community requires
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resources that often are not available to people who live in extreme poverty or in conditions of
alienation. One member of an NGO said in a focus group: When you have stable income, a normal
job and normal wages, then you will start to think about how to work on societys behalf57. A typical
causal loop: poverty hampers participation, while low levels of participation make it more difficult to
reduce social inequalities and poverty.
Poverty is by no means the only cause of limited opportunities for participation. Involvement in
social activities is also harder for people of low social or professional status, because in many
instances the ability to participate depends on the level of ones skills and knowledge. Survey data
show that the self-evaluation of Latvian residents with respect to their political competence is quite
low  66% of respondents think that most other people are better informed about politics and
government issues than they are58. In the context of globalisation, it is particularly significant that the
higher the level at which decisions are taken, the higher are the requirements of competence and
specialisation; accordingly, as social and economic processes become more complicated and
diversified, the abilities of people to engage in political participation inevitably are narrowed even
further, while feelings of incompetence and alienation are exacerbated.
If we analyse the intensity of participation in various countries, we find that the level of
participation in Latvia is quite low. The links between poverty and participation can vividly be seen in
Latvias local government elections. If we compare the 50 parishes in Latvia that have the highest
level of economic development and the 50 parishes that have the lowest, we find that in almost every
third parish among the least developed ones there was only one list of candidates for election59. In
more developed parishes the proportion of one-list local governments was considerably lower. If
participation problems exist even at the level of local governments where traditionally we find greater
levels of representativity and accountability, then there is no reason to expect a high level of
participation in other sectors of public life. Despite the fact that the number of ngos in Latvia has
increased quite rapidly over the last several years, their activity, generally speaking, remains low.
In Latvia, as in other transitional societies, the quality of participation is also diminished by the
fact that there is a considerable deficit of positive experience and expectations of potential actors; they
lack skills, knowledge and self-confidence on the one hand, while those who are in power are not
prepared for social dialogue on the other hand. Latvias residents have a fairly low opinion of their
ability to influence events. People with a lower than secondary level of education and pensioners are
much more likely than young people (up to the age of 35) and people with higher education to agree
with the statement that an individual can do very little to change the path of his life. The greatest
optimism about the path of life exists among schoolchildren and students. The lower the social
stratum in which respondents place themselves, the more often they choose pessimistic responses to
questions60. Only 24% of citizens in Latvia believe that the average citizen has considerable influence
on politics (52% disagree to this statement)61.
It is important to note that NGO participants more often than people who are not members of
ngos feel that there is a possibility to influence the decisions that are taken by local authorities or the
national government62. This is a manifestation of a causal loop: people do not believe that they can
achieve positive results, and therefor they are unable to achieve anything. Participatory experience, by
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contrast, promotes in people the belief that participation is effective, and it also strengthens self-
respect and belief in social ideals.
Even more interesting is the fact that 54% of respondents agree with the statement Even the
best politician cannot have much impact because of the way government works (19% disagree)63.
People are bewildered by the political system, not so much because of the increased number of
choices as because of the fact that it is often impossible to point with any certainty to the political
institution or individual that in the end is responsible for various processes. As the processes of
globalisation expand, this problem may become all the more acute.
The exclusion of individuals from participation is in contradiction with the right of individuals
to belong to organised communities and to be political entities. As the result of various processes,
many people in Latvia have lost these rights and are unable to reclaim them; in this way they are
being pushed out of the life of society. This is not a transitory phenomenon, it is rather a part of the
process of structural marginalisation. Exclusion and poverty are keeping people from taking
advantage of their basic rights, and in this respect they simply cease to exist. In that case, normal
reactions for an excluded person are apathy, passivity, isolation, loneliness, or the establishment of
alternative social spaces in which excluded people can find self-realisation and via which they can
express their protest. Economic exclusion provokes political exclusion, because political rights are not
harmonised with the ability of individuals to take advantage of them. The powerless are not subjects
of political or social thinking either individually or collectively. They live according to different laws,
and they devote their energies to opposition, not to participation and integration.
This is particularly important because political democratisation does not produce
automatically a strengthened civil society, a culture of citizenship and a sense of social responsibility.
(...) At the same time, and in a circular way, the vitality of civil society becomes the guarantee for the
functioning of a political democracy64. Without public involvement in the process, democracy lacks
both legitimacy and a guiding force, and as long as there is a notable participation gap between lower-
status groups and higher-status individuals, the stability of democracy can be threatened.
Political Culture. Harry Ecksteins research suggests that political culture should be studied as
an extension of other patterns of social relations and the general levels of civic inclusion in a
society65. For sociologists it is important to analyse the way in which the day-to-day activity of social
actors reproduces or restructures the basic features of a social system, as well as how the unintended
consequences of action reconstitute initial circumstances, how these activities are shaped by the
economic and political factors of society.
At first we should note that many Latvian inhabitants have a very undeveloped understanding
of political ideologies, and their political views are often contradictory. At the same time many
respondents, especially Latvians, have a tendency to support parties of right-wing and conservative
orientation, but for Russians it is more typical to support left-wing orientation parties. There are also
parties which could be describe as ethnic, because their supporters belong only to one ethic group
("Equal Rights" Party, the Party of Russian Citizens, and the Latvia Socialist Party are supported for
the most part by Russians, but the Association "Tevzemei un Brivibai/ LNNK" (For Fatherland and
Freedom/ LNNK) is supported mainly by Latvians).
Different sociological surveys demonstrate that many residents of Latvia have maintained a
simplistic view of the relationship between an individual and his society in a non-totalitarian system.
It is important here to remember that at the time when, in Western European countries, the
relationships and institutions of industrial societies began to develop, the central power of states was
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weak, but individuals acted not only under conditions of strict community control, but also in concert
with stringent religious and community norms. Whats more, self-control played at least as large a
role in the regulation of behaviour as did external control or censure. In post-socialist countries, civic
relationships began from a very different starting point and in a fundamentally different environment
 the central governments of these states were strong and tended toward expansionism, and there was
very weak moral commitment, social cohesion and capacity for self-organisation. Accordingly, even
those people in society who had a radically negative view of the communist regime and its values
continued to reproduce those values in an unconscious way, because they simply could not change
their mode of behaviour. This conflict of thought and lifestyle led to a situation where the initially
denied values and civic relationships began to re-emerge in the form of paternalism.
The essence of social change in Latvia at this time is a return to the principles of Western
democracy and open market economies, as well as a transfer from a state-centred society to a civil
society, which has a high level of self-regulation and social relations based on partnership. Two
illusions characterise this period. The first we would call the illusion of automatic democracy, which
is characterised by the idea that the rule of law and institution building (separation of power,
multiparty democracy, political freedom, human and civil liberties) are not only a necessary, but
indeed a sufficient pre-requisite for the effective work of democratic institutions. This idea can be
expressed in the thought that everything will be all right when freedom comes. This is largely due
to the fact that many people in society have a paternalistic perception of democracy, believing that if
the right people are in power, the situation will improve. Whats more, people believe that
authority is represented only by the senior officials in central political and bureaucratic structures.
The direct or indirect denial of the principle of subsidiarity and the identification of the rule of law
with authoritarianism, are pre-conditions for one of the more dangerous aspects of transformation 
the re-emergence of elements of totalitarianism.
The second illusion is that a market economy can very quickly ensure a level of welfare in
society equal to that in developed Western Europe. The results of various surveys show that
respondents most often link improvements in the economic situation to changes in government
macroeconomic policy (which usually means outright protectionism). Residents fail to assess the role
in economic processes, which is played by such microeconomic considerations as entrepreneurship,
efficiency of production, development of human resources, innovation and product quality and design.
The paternalistic interpretation of economic processes is certainly one of the most dangerous risks in
the process of transformation, because on the one hand, this interpretation creates fertile ground for a
state-centred economy with a corresponding political system, while on the other hand it means that
the subjects of the economy are not motivated to resolve problems which they are able to handle.
The lack of clear boundaries between what is permitted and what is not, the instability of
juridical relationships, and the inability of the country to ensure the implementation of accepted norms
and laws  all of this created favourable conditions for legal and moral nihilism in Latvia. As a
reaction to unreal and simplified images of democracy and market economics, Latvia experienced
increasingly critical viewpoints about existing realities. The most dangerous secondary effect of this
disillusionment was erosion in the moral criteria of society  exacerbated by societys insufficient
understanding of the way in which individual and collective types of rationality can be harmonised
and implemented in action. The disillusionment most often provoked not political radicalisation, but
rather social apathy. The latter phenomenon, too, creates favourable conditions for violation of social
norms, and, if society ignores deviations from those norms, that creates one of the most serious risks
that exist during times of transformation.
The way in which these problems are rationalised by residents is quite varied. On the one hand,
there is a widely prevalent personification of the various problems and voluntary concepts according
to which the reasons for public and state disorder must be sought in the halls of authority or they can
be blamed on malicious actions by specific political or ethnic groups. On the other hand, no less
prevalent are views which are based on determinism  a lack of belief that the individual can affect
economic and political processes, which leads some people to deny their own responsibility for what
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is happening in society. These are both radical variants, and they offer comfortable psychological
refuge in that they allow individuals to maintain a high level of self-respect. Despite the fact that the
two approaches are contradictory, they have merged in Latvia and now serve as a foundation for
paternalistic views.
There is no doubt that the Soviet regime fundamentally denied individual autonomy, reducing
opportunities for personal choice and self-expression. There is no basis, however, for equalising the
efforts of the regime with the results of these efforts. We cannot say that the communitarian values
were internalised by the largest part of society, because in that case the collapse of the system and the
subsequent political events become very difficult to explain. A simple crowd cannot be classified as a
form of collectivism, not even a form of mechanical solidarity, because the behaviour of the crowd is
determined not by such criteria as understanding of or illusions about the common good or solidarity,
but rather by guard dogs and a fear of them. We think that during the soviet years, in Eastern Europe
and the Baltic states, there was a widely prevalent, self-focused psychology of estranged
individualism.
Alienation and Trust. This is largely because many people in post-socialist countries perceive
authority only as something which stands in opposition to them  they see government as part of the
vertical relationship among members of society, and not as a projection of societys horizontal
relations. Even if government tends toward selfless sacrifice, it is doomed to loneliness if society is
alienated from it. This trend was strengthened by the aforementioned illusions, as well as a tradition
which is dominant in Latvias political culture  the tendency to assess everything through a prism of
positive normativism. As Inese Zandere wrote: Active illusions are an illness in which we very often
feel disappointed and offended, and we lose faith in the world order. We are more fond of a dressed-
up cat than an empty cradle66.
In comparison to other countries, Eastern European states, including Latvia, have a very large
proportion of residents who simply do not feel happy. The indicators in Eastern Europe, can be
explained not so much by the low standard of living among residents as by the very rapid pace at
which these standards deteriorated. Most dissatisfied are the elderly, people with a low level of
education, the handicapped, the unemployed, the retired and housewives. These people have limited
opportunities for career development, which keeps them from escaping economic depression. Greater
opportunities exist for young people, as well as those with higher education, and this is reflected in
their self-evaluation of moods. The residents of the Latvian capital city tend to be happier than people
in other cities and districts of the country. Women are much more apt to be unhappy than men. Social
pessimism is also indicated by the way in which Latvian residents assess the future prospects of
humankind: World Value Survey data show67 that most people in Latvia think that the future will be
bitter. The grimmest forecasts are made by pensioners, while students and people with higher
education have more optimistic attitudes.
The incidence of suicide has declined in Latvia over the last several years, from 42.5 per
100,000 residents in 1993 to 35.9 in 1997), but the suicide rate remains well above the level that
existed in Latvia prior to the period of transformations (26 suicides per 100,000 residents in 1990).
Generally we can conclude that higher satisfaction about their lives is found among those groups of
people who do not feel shunted aside from the processes in society.
There are several factors that facilitate the alienation of an individual. First of all, people are not
always able to adapt quickly to rapidly changing economic circumstances, and this creates in them a
feeling of helplessness. Secondly, during a period of overall transformations, social links become
unstable, and there is greater competition for jobs, wages and status levels. The result of this is a
weakening of any solidarity that may exist in relationships. Third, most people in society think that
the state should be more active in promoting increased standards of living among the population, but
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the budgets of Eastern European countries do not allow the political elite to interfere in economic
processes in any active way. Most residents perceive such policies as an unwillingness of the elite to
understand the ordinary people.
Such views are all the more common because government officials have spent quite a bit of
state money on representational expenditures, and the self-indulgent elite often fails to curb what
might be called luxury fever. Fourth, the sense of helplessness among many people is exacerbated
by the fact that individuals are inadequately informed about their rights, or they do not know how to
take advantage of them. In many cases the rights of individuals are defined in such a way that
government officials can make difficult the exercise of the rights, and individuals do not believe that
other citizens, to say nothing of high-ranking officials, are interested in defending their rights.
A surveys results indicate68 that the majority of Latvias inhabitants feel alienated, and that this
mood is in stark contrast to the general feeling during the Baltic awakening years (pre-
independence, late perestroika).
Table 4.3. - Sense of alienation (% of respondents)





What you think doesnt count very much anymore 69 (55) 16 (39) 15 (7)
Youre left out of things going on around you 31 (28) 41 (68) 28 (4)
Your participation in the elections is necessary in
order to strengthen democracy in Latvia
43 39 18
Source: Attitude of Latvias inhabitants towards Latvias accession to the European Union, 1997. In
parentheses, USA General Social Survey 1972-1982. Yearly median indicators.
Analysis of the data shows that people that feel more alienated are more likely to have a
negative attitude towards Latvias membership in the EU. The feelings of alienation are less distinct
among the youth. Of those under 30, 20% feel pushed aside of events. In the age group between 31
and 50, 24% feel alienated, but of elderly respondents 40% feel this way. The feeling of alienation is
more common among people with higher education. Obviously, this latter group perceives the
problem with a slightly more bitter touch due to their unrealised potential.
One rather unusual phenomenon is worth mentioning. On the one hand, a large percentage of
respondents look towards the EU with suspicion and are ready to delegate policy-making only to the
Latvian government. On the other hand, 85% of the respondents feel that the majority of government
officials are not really interested in the problems of the average person (dont agree - 5%, no answer
- 11%). However, if one compares Latvias data with those obtained in the US, then the situation in
Latvia does not appear to be all that dramatic.
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Table 4.4. - Evaluation of officials
% of respondentsAssessment
Agree Disagree Do not
know
No answer
Most officials are not really interested
in the problems of the average person
85 (73) 5 (23) 8 (2) 3 (1)
Source: Attitude of Latvias inhabitants towards Latvias accession to the European Union, 1997. In
parentheses, 1994 USA General Social Survey data
Trust to state institutions is an important indicator of the society and characterise persons state
identity. Different surveys demonstrate that both citizens as well as non-citizens have more trust in
schools, mass media and churches. Citizens had more trust in these institutions as compared with non-
citizens: 83% of citizens and 70% of non-citizens trust schools; 79% of citizens and 65% of non-
citizens trust television; 78% and 58% - radio; 64% and 56% - the press. It should be noted here that
the police and the courts are a little more trusted by the non-citizens as compared with citizens,
despite the fact that, as we know, only citizens can work in these institutions. 28% of citizens and
22% of non-citizens feel trust to the trade unions, while the trust to political parties are very low -
only 12% of citizens and 10% of non-citizens trust them. Citizens trust in local governments more
frequently than non-citizens (52% and 36%). Only little bit more than twenty percent of respondents
(both citizens as well as non-citizens) has trust in parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers69.
It is not unimportant that the lifestyle options that are made available by democratisation and
market economies offer many opportunities, and this exacerbates feelings of powerlessness if a person
wants everything right now and proves unable to limit his or her desires. The openness of the world is
creating an indefinite range of possibilities, but this openness can also paralyse individuals if they are
inclined to doubt everything. Furthermore, an increase in opportunities does not by any means
guarantee that an equal freedom of activity has appeared, and for those people for whom openness is a
completely new situation, the inability to take advantage of the associated opportunities very often
causes psychological problems.
During rapid transformations people feel more intensively that they are losing autonomy over
their life circumstances, that they cannot alter, resist or escape from their surrounding social
environment. The more diverse and large-scale becomes a social and economic environment, the
greater is probability that individuals will feel powerless and boundaries of their responsibilities can
be narrowed.
                                                       
69 Human Development Report. Latvia. 1998. Riga, p.39
37 5. National and regional integration
5. National and regional integration
Human development is a process of enlarging peoples choices. These choices pertain not only
to the economic and political realms, but also to each persons cultural, religious and linguistic
identity or identities. Identities often overlap and merge with each other. In the realm of culture,
religion and language, human development requires preserving and fostering diversity as a factor that
enriches society. For diversity to promote harmony and not social strife, it is essential to strengthen
common values and interests70.
Culture defines the values, moral norms, responsibilities, and rights of members of society, and
it influences their individuality, way of life, identity. Moreover, culture is the condition for mutual
trust, tolerance, and solidarity between members of society, indeed for the survival of a civil society.
Latvian cultural policy must ensure favourable conditions for maintaining the cultural values of the
Latvian nation and national minorities; it must raise public awareness of the modern and historical
value of the Latvian cultural environment, Latvian and national minority cultures. It must establish the
terms for cultural dialogue, foster respect and tolerance of other cultures, and guarantee the
individual's right to express, protect, and develop his or her ethnic, cultural, and religious identity.
Latvia has not been immune from debate between those who support the idea that foreigners
should be culturally assimilated and those who are in favour of multiculturalism, or the idea that
people from various cultures should have the right to preserve them. In Latvia attitude toward the
integration of ethnic minorities is illustrated by the response of respondents to the following
statement: It is impossible for people who do not share local customs and traditions to become fully
Latvian (see table 6.1).
At the same time 61% of Latvians and 82% of non-Latvians think that ethnic minorities
should be given government assistance to help to preserve their customs and traditions (National
identity, 1995). 65% of non-citizens and 55% of citizens believe that it is very important to achieve
integration of ethnic minorities in the Latvian society (survey Towards a Civic Society).
Table 5.1. - People who do not share local customs and traditions cannot become
fully Latvian
% of all respondents Latvians Non-Latvians
Fully agree 34 42 24
Agree 30 28 33
Disagree 9 7 11
Fully disagree 6 4 8
Source: ISSP module National Identity, 1995. (Latvia: Latvians r=618, non-Latvians r=317;)
If integration is to be a process that will influence the future development of Latvian society,
then we must expect to change current attitudes toward non-Latvians. We think that it is time to
replace the notion of non-Latvians as strangers with that of non-Latvians as distinct, but co-
existing with Latvians, the approach of non-Latvians as alienated with that of non-Latvians as
partners in co-operation. At the same time integration strategy could not support the formation of a
two-community state (the model of two societies in one nation), confrontation between elements of
society, segregation or forced assimilation and ethnofederalist tendencies that would undermine the
formation of a unified national Latvian state.
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The political, cultural or social integration of society occurs when various groups discover or
create common values and interests over time. The result of democratic integration is the emergence
in society of a new, broader sense of belonging and loyalty alongside diverse cultural identities.
Democratic integration in the Latvian context means movement towards a wider sense of belonging
that could be called the Latvian political nation. However, in this process of integration it is important
to preserve and protect cultural differences and the languages of other nationalities and to avoid
forced assimilation71.
Cultural processes in independent Latvia have maintained some elements of historical
continuity but have also gained new traits. Continuity can be noted in the high prestige awarded to
culture, widespread popular participation in amateur cultural activities such as singing in choirs and
nurturing traditional folk art forms. Radical changes have taken place in the relationship of culture to
economics and politics. Intellectual freedom defines the new diversity of artistic self-expression, the
development of subcultures, and the free progress of Latvian and minority culture. At the same time,
values have begun to be influenced and levelled intensely by mass culture. The cultural infrastructure
is unevenly developed, and the system for funding culture is disorganised.
At the present moment there are several problems in the sphere of culture that impede
integration of society:
1. Uneven distribution of cultural values. In recent years our society has seen a rapid
stratification both between and within social groups and ethnic communities. A decline in the quality
of life and political polarisation accented social trends toward segregation, mistrust and alienation.
Under these conditions a co-operative spirit or civic institutions can not develop; broad sectors of
population feel unclear about their life prospects, and there is limited access to cultural assets. Many
members of Latvian society have a simplified, insufficient understanding of values, moral norms,
their own responsibilities and rights, and other existential issues; they have serious problems
maintaining their identity and consciousness, and often their way of life is antisocial. These groups
disrupt the strengthening of mutual trust, solidarity, and civil society, and they do not display respect
and tolerance for other cultures, human rights, or freedom.
2. Insufficient development of common cultural spaces and common cultural values. National
and local governments have only partially secured the preservation and development of Latvia's
cultural values. Since the conditions for Latvian cultural development and expansion are not
beneficial, culture can play only a limited role in integration; only an influential, active and tolerant
Latvian culture can promote cultural dialogue in Latvia. Society does not share a common
understanding about the nature of interaction between Latvian and minority cultures. Culture has not
done enough to form social self-awareness and tolerance. Simplified and biased interpretations of
history promote historical bitterness; cultural identities often are oriented only to the past thus creating
an unfavourable environment for a cultural dialogue. Contradictory perceptions of cultural values
delay integration and the convergence of Latvians and non-Latvians, citizens and non-citizens into a
democratic, open civil society with equal interaction of cultures.
Currently, ethnic stereotypes are being reproduced vigorously, cultural differences and
singularities are overemphasised, common or similar traits are ignored, and mutual enrichment
between cultures is undervalued in principle and practice. Moreover, there is no institutional structure
that could promote a unified and diverse cultural life as a part of the integration process, bringing
together Latvians and minority representatives. The protection of cultural autonomy and minority
language rights must be balanced with integration, with mechanisms to protect and invigorate Latvian
as the national language. An opposite continuity could provoke separatism and ethnic isolation,
whereby culture would become a barrier to communication. The politicisation of culture, when culture
begins to lose its unifying humanitarian aspects, should be avoided. To prevent this, integration must
enter the realm of culture, creating a process that would overcome ethnic boundaries and develop
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cultural dialogue as the dominant paradigm. This calls for fairly radical changes in the situation of
Latvian culture.
3. Gap between cultural policy and social needs. Current Latvian cultural legislation only
partially addresses social needs and the necessity for integration. The Cultural Autonomy Law ought
to guarantee minorities the right to cultural self-expression, and the opportunity to maintain and freely
shape their cultural identity; this would not only aid in preserving minority ethnic identity, but also in
strengthening minority loyalty to the Latvian nation.
First laws that regulated Latvian cultural processes and protected Latvian and minority cultural
heritage were passed in the early 1990s. These were: the Laws on the Protection of Cultural
Monuments, on Archives, on the Latvian National Library, on Religious Organisations, the many
amendments and modifications of other laws, and the Cabinet regulations that directly or indirectly
related to the cultural sphere. Also, the Law On the Unrestricted Development and Right to Cultural
Autonomy of Latvia's Nationalities and Ethnic Groups, was adopted already in March 1991. These
laws together create opportunities to protect ethnic identity, intellectual freedom, and Latvian and
minority cultural values, but cannot guarantee the future development of these values.
Latvian minority cultures are inseparable parts of Latvian culture. Minority languages are used
on Latvian television and radio; the minority cultural heritage is distinct yet fitting in the Latvian
architectural and cultural environment; place-names of historical minority are used throughout the
territory of Latvia; minority intelligentsia promotes Latvian culture in the non-Latvian community;
the contribution of minority intelligentsia to Latvian and world culture is impressive.
Since 1988, inspired by the national awakening, the formation of national and ethnic cultural
societies and associations defined the terms of a renaissance within minority cultural life. Compared
to the pre-war situation ethnic minorities in Latvia have much greater opportunities today to establish
and maintain contacts with their ethnic homelands and most often this co-operation occurs in the
cultural and education fields, in particular in respect to the work of the ethnic minority schools.72
Unfortunately, in the following years, no mechanism was developed to suit the cultural
autonomy of the national Latvian state, which could widely influence minority cultural life, protect
minority identity, renew cultural traditions or pass those on to the post-war immigrant community.
Therefore, the existing form of cultural autonomy insufficiently promotes non-citizens' integration
into Latvian society. Non-Latvian participation in culturally related legislation and its implementation
has so far been inconsistent, because the renewal of cultural autonomy has not been fully guaranteed.
We think that the chief goals and tasks of regional integration are: 1) to mitigate and prevent
unfavourable regional disparities, while promoting preservation of valuable natural and cultural
diversity; 2) to promote integration of non-citizens into the mainstream of Latvian citizenry and
Latvian nation and to unite Latvian citizens of non-Latvian descent more closely with Latvian society
and culture.
The goals of integration are: 1) to create an understanding of values, moral norms,
responsibilities and rights, that foster trust, tolerance, and solidarity within society; 2) to create the
preconditions for a balanced and dynamic civil society; 3) to safeguard cultural assets and to
encourage cultural dialogue; 4) to guarantee individuals right to freely express, protect and develop
his/her ethnic, cultural and religious identity.
These goals could be subdivided in separate tasks: 1) to strengthen governments support for
the protection of Latvian cultural wealth and research for cultural development, which are
prerequisites for cultural integration; 2) to guarantee the protection and development of Latvian and
minority cultural values; 3) to enhance the public's understanding of national and ethnic cultural
values, and to create favourable conditions for dialogue between cultures; 4) to foster respect and
tolerance for other cultures, free expression of individual rights, and the protection and development
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of ethnic, cultural and religious identity; 5) to encourage participation of all national and ethnic
groups in nationally significant legislation; to support the creation of civic organisations; 6) to
encourage ethnic understanding, to reconcile the historical perspectives of various ethnocultural
groups, and to encourage participation in cross-cultural activities.
All preconditions for strengthening national integration and social cohesion already exist in
Latvia: powerful traditions of non-violent conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence have evolved
the opinions of Latvians and non-Latvians have converged on almost all issues (including the
necessity of Latvian language skill); a long-term programme to promote Latvian language learning
has been adopted; essential laws regulating naturalisation and the status of non-citizens have been
passed and important groundwork has been done towards initiating a dialogue between government
and national minorities.
However, thus far harmony has often rested on the passivity and political alienation of the
public. It is important to remove possible sources of tension, so that increased participation
encourages integration and social cohesion. As Latvia enters European structures and assumes
important international obligations, it is necessary to remedy shortcomings in legislation affecting
national minorities and non-citizens and to bring into accord Latvias laws and administrative practice
with European standards73.
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6. Attitudes towards European integration
This chapter analysis how the pressure of local and global factors influences formation of
national identity and changes system-self relations, focusing primarily on the way in which the
positioning of agents in the social space might influence their reflexive self-regulation or behaviour,
as well as the way in which the civil society is being developed. In the Eastern European context,
problems that are linked to globalisation are quite neatly illustrated by the process of EU enlargement.
In this analysis we shall not attempt to equalise these two phenomena, but we do feel it useful to
analyse the way in which the inhabitants of these countries perceive relations with the Union.
If we base our reasoning on the zero-sum concept of power, we can conclude that the process of
globalisation and the emergence of a new geography of power mean that certain centres of power
are obtaining or increasing their influence at the expense of other centres of power. Usually this
pertains to the idea that national parliaments, which are the institutional form of the idea of
representation, are losing power, and then we can say that representational rights are being limited. In
these processes, the power of civil society institutions also declines considerably, which means that
not only the role of representative democracy, but also the role of participatory democracy is
deteriorating. Accordingly, we may well ask to what extent the inhabitants of Europe are prepared for
so fundamental a revision of the principles of democracy.
The global institutional order has its own logic, and, to an increasing extent, many of the
initiatives of local institutions are projects, which are aimed at reacting to the decisions of semi-
autonomous international institutions. Critics of this new international order speak of a democratic
deficit  the idea that the process of politics is becoming less credible and that governance systems
are increasingly being based not on the voice of the people, but rather on the voice of the market.
It is the opinion of these critics that the greater the dependence of politics on supra-national-juridical-
political decisions, the lesser the sense of parliamentary democracy  and the result is an increase in
the democratic deficit. The more a political system becomes dependent on exogenous, not endogenous
factors, the more important is the issue of congruence between the political system on one side and
the culture or economy of the nation on the other.
Even though virtually all international institutions recognise subsidiarity as one of their basic
principles, decentralisation and globalisation are power vectors that are difficult to reconcile, because
they are really quite different. We may well ask, therefore, to what extent the institutions and patterns
of action of the new global political system are congruent not only with existing political institutions,
but also with the European traditions of political culture. We may also think about the consequences
that this deficit of congruence might create. Here we basically are speaking about a contemporary
paraphrasing of the ideas of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verbas.
According to data from the World Values Survey, in the industrialised world, between 1981
and 1990, there was a considerable reduction in the authority of the state74. The political leaders of
these states have lost political support, and not because they are any less competent than previous
leaders. This is illustrated by the fact that there has been a systematic deterioration in the level of
support among the public for the political institutions in various countries. In our view social
scientists should devote greater attention to Ingleharts thesis that the reduction of state authority
suggests that political systems must change and that a new and effective formula of legitimacy must
emerge that signifies the creation of post-modern policies75.
If we agree that these processes cannot be described on the basis of a zero-sum conception of
power, then we must explain the way in which globalisation can increase the political influence of
national parliaments and non-governmental organisations. On the one hand, the political opportunities
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of national parliaments have been expanded by international organisations. On the other hand, the
abilities of small and large countries to influence the decisions of international organisations vary
radically, and the critics of international organisations use this as an argument in claiming that these
structures are only partly democratic. The consistent observance of democratic principles, however 
the observance not only of the rights of the majority, but also the rights of the minority  makes
decision-making processes considerably slower at best, or even impossible, thus making such
organisations unable to work at all.
The complex nature of problems that are involved with globalisation is known very well by
politicians and by larger groups in society. In the first instance, a visible example is the hesitation of
EU decision-makers to co-opt new member countries. The attitudes of Europeans vis- -vis Eastern
Europe are also very contradictory. Only 39% of Europeans, according to a 1998 survey of the
Standard Eurobarometer, in which the views of people in the 15 European Union member states were
averaged, are in favour of Latvias membership in the EU, while 36% are opposed76. Even fewer
respondents are ready to support Latvias accession to NATO. If at one time Eastern Europeans were
separated from the rest of the continent by the Iron Curtain, then now the problem is a situation that
could neatly be formulated by the phrase The door is open, entry denied. Unpredictable Russia,
which many Eastern Europeans fear because of their historical experience, does not want to lose its
influence in the region, while those whom the Eastern Europeans are seeking to join are refusing
them. There is no need to prove specifically that such policies provoke feelings of geopolitical
alienation among Eastern Europeans, including the residents of Latvia, because many of them feel
that they belong to Europe.
On the other hand, various surveys have shown that over the last several years the attitudes of
Latvias residents vis- -vis the EU have become more critical. A similar dynamic of attitudes has also
been seen in other Eastern European countries. Many respondents are worried about the possibility
that EU membership might have a deleterious effect on Latvias economic development, on the
welfare of the countrys population, on the external security and defence of the country, and on the
culture, identity and independent statehood of the Latvian nation. An organisation that operates under
the auspices of Latvias Environmental Protection Club, A Different Europe, recently formulated
what it calls 10 arguments against Latvian membership in the EU77. According to these people, the
involvement of new countries in the EU and the associated process of cultural integration are being
moved forward by market expansion interests. The EU, they claim, ignores the foundations of long-
term and sustainable development, focusing instead only on financial expansion; the EU has not been
able to resolve the problem of the deficit of democracy; the Latvian economy can expect not growth,
but rather a denuding of resources and the labour force; there will be an intellectual brain drain from
Latvia; and the interests of residents will be subordinated to those of transnational corporations.
Russian-speaking non-citizens also tend to doubt that the westward orientation of the Baltic states is
in everyone's interest78.
Survey results show that in order to feel secure about the correctness of their vote in a
potential referendum on EU membership, respondents want to know precisely how membership
would influence Latvias economic development and the well-being of inhabitants, as well as how it
would affect Latvias external security and defence (see table 7.1). Many respondents see the gains of
membership in the context of the development of the individual and society, and not only in economic
terms. The results of the survey disclose that middle-aged respondents show greater interest in
questions of democracy, a state ruled by law and membership in the EU, but younger respondents are
more interested in how membership can affect educational and job opportunities.
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Table 6.1. - Factors determining respondents attitude towards EU
A referendum will obviously be organised on Latvia joining the European
Union. In order to feel secure about your vote, you would need to known
how membership might affect Latvia. Please indicate no more than
4 questions, which you feel you need to know more about.
% of
respondents
Latvias economic development and the peoples well-being 75
State foreign security and defence 57
Latvian culture, identity, and state sovereignty 51
Social protection, healthy way of life 40
Educational and job opportunities 35
Development of democracy and a legal state 34
State internal security and crime 32
Latvias environmental protection 28
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union79
Residents in the EU member countries, for their part, feel that the most important criteria in the
area of enlargement include whether a country that is applying for membership respects human rights
and democracy; whether it has joined the fight against organised crime and narcotics trafficking;
whether it protects the environment; and whether it will be able to carry its share of the EU budget.
More than three-quarters of respondents feel that an important criteria is this one: Its joining should
not be costly for existing member countries (79%). A slightly lower percentage favours the criterion
Its level of economic development should be close to that of other Member States (77%)80. In
another Standard Eurobarometer survey81, respondents were asked about the fears and expectations of
people about the building of Europe. 52% of respondents said that they believe expansion to the
East is costing too much, while some 44% said that they fear the enlargement process.
Views amongst the Latvian respondents on which questions should be left to the Latvian
government and which should be solved jointly by the Latvian government and EU officials were
rather varied (see table 7.2). The comparison between Latvia and EU member states makes it possible
to conclude that a large number of Latvias inhabitants have no position regarding which functions
should be reserved for the Latvian government and which issues should be solved together with EU
institutions. This is especially typical of respondents with lower education.
For comparison, one should note that in the question about the sovereignty of national state
policy and EU common policy, there was no consensus in the European Union either. In many
countries, respondents would rather delegate issues of state defence to their national governments. A
1998 Standard Eurobarometer 50 survey shows that in Finland 86% of respondents supported this
stance, in Sweden - 71%, and to a lesser degree these views were predominant in Denmark, Ireland,
and Great Britain. At the same time, other countries inhabitants feel that these questions should be
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resolved by the national governments together with the EU (this view is supported by 74% of the
respondents in the Netherlands, and it was predominant in Germany, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy).
EU member states do not enjoy a consensus on issues of agriculture either. Thus, the majority
of respondents in the Netherlands (70%), France, Belgium, Germany, and Denmark are ready to
entrust agricultural policy to the EU, whereas the majority of respondents in Finland (74%), Sweden
(57%), Great Britain (47%), and Spain (48%) feel that agriculture should remain in the competence of
the national government.
Table 6.2. - Policies: national or EU level decision-making* (% of respondents)
Which of the following areas of policy do you think
should be decided by the Latvian government, and










Cultural policy 68 (55) 11 (37) 21 (8)
The fight against unemployment 54 (45) 30 (51) 16 (4)
Workers rights vis- -vis their employers 53 (54) 25(40) 21 (6)
Health and social welfare 49 (62) 31 (33) 20 (5)
Education 48(60) 34(35) 18 (5)
Currency 39 (42) 36 (51) 27 (7)
Agriculture and fishing policy 37 (43) 41 (50) 22 (7)
Foreign policy towards countries outside the EU 35 (23) 40 (69) 25 (8)
Supporting regions which are experiencing economic
difficulties
31 (32) 46 (61) 23 (7)
Immigration policy 27 (39) 52 (55) 22 (6)
Protection of the environment 25 (33) 60 (63) 15 (4)
Defence 16 (42) 71 (52) 13 (6)
The fight against crime 8 82 6
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union In
parentheses, Standard Eurobarometer 47, 1997 survey data on average indicators in EU member states.
There is no real agreement on immigration policy either: in Finland (74%), Sweden (55%),
Denmark, and Austria, the majority of respondents are in favour of these issues remaining in the
competence of the national government, while in Spain (68%), Italy (76%), and France (64%) the
majority of respondents feel that the EU should be dealing with these issues.
In several countries, majorities of the populations do not support the introduction of EMU.
There are some differences between countries on the issue of environmental protection, foreign policy
towards countries which are not EU member states, and in the fight against unemployment - the
majority of EU respondents feel that these are issues which the national governments must solve
together with the EU.
The table data show quite clearly that the residents of European countries are fairly far from
having a common understanding about the kind of institutional framework and the kind of policies
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that Europe should have. Accordingly, the taking of various political decisions (or the failure to take
decisions) can be perceived by a specific segment of the population as a process in which its views are
ignored, and this could provoke both a greater sense of alienation and a crisis of legitimacy.
Survey respondents in Latvia were asked82 to mark some of the advantages, opportunities and
positive aspects of Latvias integration into the EU. In general, Latvian respondents saw the right to
live and work in another EU country as the most important advantage of EU membership (41% of
respondents). Almost as many cited the abolishment of passport controls on the borders of EU
member states (40%).
Many economic specialists, for their part, believe that Latvian producers are not ready for the
EU economically, in terms of the adequacy of their existing technology or financially. They feel that
many producers, especially farmers, are not even aware of the EUs quality requirements, let alone are
ready to fulfil them; they lack the resources for the modernisation of production. Trade with EU
countries is also hindered by the fact that such trade usually requires high volumes of output,
something that is not within the capabilities of small and medium-sized companies in Latvia. Retailers
and wholesalers, meanwhile, are worried that as Latvia moves closer to the EU, more and more
foreign traders will come into the country, and because they will have greater volumes of orders, they
will depress prices and push local retailers out of the market, especially given that Latvias tax
policies are not favourable to low-volume traders83. Many farmers are critical of the fact that the EU
subsidises its farmers while teaching Latvia that this should not be done. Accordingly, our farmers
must compete with European farmers on unequal terms, and, moreover, Latvias products have
trouble meeting quality requirements in the West84.
In a research project conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University
of Latvia, readers of the newspaper Lauku Avize were asked which social groups would benefit or lose
if Latvia became a member of the European Union (see table 7.3).
First of all, it would be important to note that many of the surveys respondents answered this
question by marking off do not know, no answer or no impact. Secondly, the results of our survey
are similar to those obtained through Central and Eastern European Barometer (CEEB)85 November
1997 sample survey taken of the general population of Latvia. In both surveys the predominant
opinion was that EU membership would most positively affect Latvias inhabitants as consumers
(goods, commercial and public services, as well as education and health) and not as the creators of
material values. The 1997 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB 8) survey showed that Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland respondents assessed potential gains more cautiously than
respondents in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
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Table 6.3. - Respondents opinions on winners and losers (% of respondents)
Do you thing the following groups of people in
Latvia are likely to benefit as ties between Latvia
and the European Union increase? What do you











Armed Forces 55 2 6 37
Educational system 51 6 11 33
Private business 42 11 10 37
Health and social services 39 6 13 41
Consumers 39 8 11 41
Civil servants 20 10 25 45
Manual workers 22 22 19 37
People living on low incomes 21 27 18 34
State enterprises 19 26 9 46
Farmers 15 63 3 19
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union
Respondents attitude towards Latvia joining the EU is closely linked to their perception of the
nature of these relations. Compared to other countries, Latvia has many respondents who feel that
their country would gain from membership in the EU. There are comparatively fewer respondents
who feel that both sides would benefit. Obviously, not many people have a clear idea of the benefits
that EU membership offers. It must be noted that the attitude of respondents from different EU
member states towards their countrys gains and losses varies quite widely. According to the Standard
Eurobarometer 50 (1998), asked the question Would you say that (y)our country has on balance
benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? - 21% of the respondents did not
reply. The answer has benefited was more often mentioned by Ireland (85%), Luxembourg (69%),
Greece (76%), the Netherlands (67%), Belgium (44%), and Italy (51%). But the answer not
benefited was more often mentioned by respondents in Sweden (53%), in Finland (44%), and in
Great Britain (42%).
Table 7.4. - Perception of relations between Latvia and the European Union
Who do you think benefits most from the relationship between
Latvia and the European Union? Is it the European Union, Latvia,




The European Union 21
Both benefit equally 22
Do not know, no answer 27
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union
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It is significant that the stance of Latvias pro-Europeans, Eurosceptics, and undecided differed
quite radically (see table 7.5). Latvias pro-Europeans feel that Latvia or both sides equally will
benefit from Latvia joining the EU. The Eurosceptics feel that the EU will gain more (from Latvia
joining the EU). The majority of respondents who lacked a concrete opinion on this were in the
category of those who would not vote in a referendum and, of course, the undecided.
Table 7.5. - Attitude towards EU and notion of who would benefit (% of respondents)
Notion of who would benefit
Attitude Latvia EU countries Both sides
equally
Hard to say
Vote for membership 55 4 31 10
Vote against
membership
7 60 9 27
Would not vote 18 29 12 41
Undecided 24 13 24 39
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union
Respondents views on the reasons preventing them from better understanding relations
between Latvia and the EU are indicated in the table 20. The results lead one to think that the main
obstacle for better understanding the EU is not peoples lack of interest or a vacuum of information,
but rather the low level of trust that society holds for the government, as well as the governments
inadequate effort to explain things. Six out of ten respondents admitted that they do not believe the
explanations and recommendations of state officials. Whats more, every other respondent indicated
that the government has not done enough to explain what the benefits and costs will be if Latvia joins
the EU. In this context, only every tenth respondent indicated that the mass media are not devoting
enough attention to issues of European integration.
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Table 6.6. - Impediments preventing understanding of relations between Latvia and
the EU.
What, in your opinion, is the biggest impediment preventing our society in
better understanding relations between Latvia and the European Union?
% of
respondents
People do not trust government officials; therefore, they do not believe their
explanations and recommendations
61%
The government hasnt done enough to explain the possible benefits or losses
of membership
55%
People do not take an interest in these issues because they do not see how
Latvias EU membership could affect their lives
34%
The information available is too complicated 25%
The press, radio, and TV do not grant these issues enough attention 11%
EU problems are presented in a boring way 8%
Source: Survey Attitude of Latvias Inhabitants towards Latvias Accession to the European Union
This shows that in fact criticism is directed not so much at the mass media but at the authorities.
The Eurosceptics exhibit the most mistrust towards government officials, which leads one to think
about the link between distrust of the government and a sceptical attitude towards the EU. Mistrust of
the government is less common among the youth than among elderly respondents (48% and 68%
respectively).
Overall we can conclude that a large share of the Latvian population looks at the EU with hope,
albeit mostly because people feel that the main danger to the countrys independence is of foreign
origin. For a long time many residents of the Baltic States saw their countries as a bridge between
West and East, or between North and South, but this euphoria has receded. With increasing frequency
people are feeling that they do not belong to anything, or else they perceive the present-day role of
their country in Europe as a normal situation. Here it is worth remembering that data from a range of
sociological research projects (World Values Survey, International Social Survey Programme) show
that in virtually all of the countries of Europe  including Eastern Europe  people basically identify
themselves with their countries, and considerably less often with a smaller or larger regional
community. Accordingly, the self-respect of residents largely depends on, among other things, how
highly they think of their countrys foreign policy status.
Secondly  and sociological data show this, too  Latvias integration into the European Union
is most often perceived by society as an issue for the government to deal with. People in Latvia
continue to underestimate one important aspect of the civil society  the personal role of individuals,
as well as the role of NGOs, initiative groups and local communities, in the integration process, in
dialogue, and in the search for a better understanding about the European Union.
Over the last decade, European countries have experienced fairly rapid increases in GDP levels,
but the share of GDP that is represented by state spending is not diminishing. This means that
resources are increasingly being concentrated in the hands of politicians and civil servants.
Simultaneously, we are hearing increasing criticism of governments as being weak. On the one
hand, governments to a great extent have become emancipated from societies, but the cost has been a
fall in the credibility of governments among the citizens. The consequence is institutional isolation
and inefficient work. Societies begin to operate in concert with their own internal logic, while
government activities become increasingly reminiscent of an attempt to conduct a waterfall.
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On the other hand, governments today are feeling limitations on their sovereignty ever more
frequently, and domestic policies are being sacrificed on the altar of foreign policy demands. The
right of veto is often too strong to use. In both instances politicians are accused of being overly
market-conforming and insufficiently society-oriented. In countries, where the right to use
representative and participatory forms of democracy has been recovered only recently, the narrowing
of these opportunities under the influence of globalisation is being perceived most painfully. At the
same time ISSP module Role of Government (1996) data show that approximately the same
percentage of Latvians (47%), Norwegians (38%) and Swedes (44%) agree with statement Our
country should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations.
There is no doubt that the contradictions that exist in a country that on the one hand is
increasing its financial might, but on the other hand is facing institutional weakening in tandem with
an expanded sense of irresponsibility among the populace, can surely create threats against the
balanced development of any society. Accordingly, there is good reason to ask whether globalisation
might not facilitate the erosion of mechanisms that create moral norms (i.e., the self-regulation of
individuals), as well as standards for societal self-regulation (i.e., the self-regulation of group
relationships). What, after all, might safeguard morals and identities when law enforcement becomes
even more complicated, but no more effective? And how can we achieve a situation in which




Latvian history is turbulent and bloody and Latvia has long been a disputed battleground for
different peoples: Russians, Swedes, Baltic Germans and latterly Soviets. Their physical battles are
reflected in contests over historical truth and its ownership, not least among Latvians themselves. In
analyzing the development of social thought, we must first note that the social views of the Latvian
intelligentsia have generally been based on the intellectual foundations of Europe, and especially 18th
and 19th century Germany. It is precisely on these foundations that the Latvian intelligentsias ideas
of nationalism and anti-feudalism are based.
The spread of these ideas was also facilitated by economic conditions in Latvia. Nationalism
satisfies a psychological desire for community, and the emergence of nationalism in Latvia can be
seen as a counter-reaction to the social entropy that was provoked by the appearance of market
economics. The social ideas of the most noteworthy Latvian thinkers of that time developed in
confrontations with the Baltic Germans who felt that the Latvian language could never rise above the
level of a kitchen language and that Latvians would never be able to create a national culture or an
economic elite.
Representatives of the imperial Russian administration and the Orthodox Church thought
largely along similar lines. Latvians were such a small nation, they thought, that inevitably they would
turn to German or Russian culture and therefor Latvians ought to be assimilated. Russian bureaucrats
and ideologists did not believe that the small nations of the empire could ever have much of a future.
Even Belarussians and Ukrainians were not seen as national cultural communities by those who
believed that the nations of the Russian Empire would inevitably fold into a unified Russian nation.
In the pre-revolutionary period, attempts by the Russian bureaucracy to impose controls over
the administration of the Baltic region were hindered by the Baltic German landed gentry, which
sought at all costs to defend and protect the legal privileges which it had accumulated over the
centuries. The Russian bureaucracy did not have sufficient resources to fight this battle and to
implement assimilation-based policies, too. Many Russian bureaucrats were in fact quite tolerant of
Latvian cultural activism, because they hoped that as the influence of German culture waned, the
economic and political influence of the Baltic German gentry and clergy would decline, as well.
Accordingly, differences between the German and the Russian elites in fact kept both sides from
implementing assimilation policies in Latvia. Social stratification of society also hindered the efforts
of the ruling elites to implement assimilation policies among the Latvians.
For many centuries the indigenous Latvian culture could be expressed only through highly
developed folklore traditions, and folk songs were used as cultural markers, eventually coming to be
seen virtually as holy texts which expressed and sustained Latvian identity. The folk songs were
elevated to scriptural status through annual song festivals and through their use in various life-cycle
rituals. It is in this quasi-religious sense that Latvians initially formed a textual community.
In the mid-19th century, a Latvian-speaking urban elite began to emerge in Latvia, and the so-
called New Latvians movement was launched. One of the first tasks for the New Latvians was to
promote the development of the Latvian culture and its reputation. The New Latvians sought to
rehabilitate the Latvian peasant identity, and Latvian literature played a central role in this process.
Thanks to the activities of the New Latvians, and especially to the significance which they
attached to the values of education, large groups of the Latvian population became acquainted with
the social ideas, as well as the ideas of the natural sciences, that prevailed in Western Europe at that
time. The New Latvians actively supported early efforts by ethnic Latvians to engage in business,
something that previously had been the sole provenance of Germans. They spoke up against the
economic and political privileges of the German landed gentry, feeling that these privileges were
hampering the development of Latvian economic independence. At the end of the 19th century, new
accents appeared in Latvian thinking, fueled by the development of the Marxist-influenced New
Current (Jauna Strava) movement.
51 Summary
It was only in the 1920s that the Latvian nation for the first time won the right to shape its own
history. Prior to that most Latvians had not even believed that such an opportunity might emerge, and
this meant that Latvian national self-understanding was formed through the contradictions between
power and culture. Only culture could serve the Latvian need for freedom and self-respect, because
until the independent Latvian state was proclaimed, power always belonged to other nationalities.
Power was the source of subordination, not pride, for the Latvian nation.
The 1920s and 1930s today are often seen as the golden age for ethnic Latvians. The Russian
community in Latvia was not confrontational in relations with Germans or Latvians. Russian culture
between the two world wars developed in complete alienation from Russia itself, but this allowed
Russians in Latvia to preserve traditions which were severely deformed in the Soviet Union. The
cultural life of the Russian community in Latvia was largely based on the governments policies of
cultural autonomy for Latvias ethnic minorities. There were Russian schools in Latvia, along with a
Russian theater in Riga, several Russian-language literary journals, and a number of newspapers.
Latvian thinkers in this era also devoted a great deal of attention to national issues. The
ideologues of Latvian nationalism had a negative attitude toward political liberalism and
parliamentarianism, and they held collective rights to be higher than individual rights. The ideology of
Latvian nationalists was not, however, typified by intolerance against representatives of other
nationalities. Rather, Latvian nationalism was characterized by a dislike of Marxism, which
propagandized other ideas about solidarity. Like other nationalists, the ideologues of Latvian
nationalism worshipped at the altar of rural patriarchies and rural lifestyles, criticizing everything that
had to do with industry.
The first period of Soviet occupation in the Baltic States began in 1940 and lasted for one year.
There were arrests and deportations targeted against people who held senior positions in government,
the military and the economy. After World War II, political repression continued to be widespread.
The collectivization of farming was forced upon unwilling Balts  a process which involved the
deportation of fully one-tenth of the farmers on the night March 25, 1949. The historian Heinrihs
Strods has calculated that 191,673 Latvians were exiled or imprisoned in all, and that number of
people is equivalent to approximately 15% of the Latvian population in 1959. Some scholars think
that as the Holocaust has become central to Jewish identity, so deportation has come to constitute a
central feature of Latvian identity. Latvian narrators often account for survival in terms of the power
of ethnic qualities. They keenly sense the feeling of being victims of a senseless historical drama.
The history of the last 50 years has provided the building blocks from which Latvians today
construct their life stories. Arrests, deportations, exile and return to the homeland  these are the nodal
points in Latvian narratives, and they reflect great population movements and losses. Independence
created a great sense of community in Latvia in the early 1990s, and along with it came the
rediscovery of the individual voice. People have published memoirs about the years of deportation,
the aim being not only to recapture the past, but also to offer Latvians a common identity.
Many of the migrants who arrived in Latvia between the 1960s and the 1980s knew little or
nothing about Latvias true history. Others were convinced that Stalinist repression was waged only
against enemies of the soviet state (or, to use the lexicon of the time, enemies of the people). Once a
public debate began over the events of the 1940s, both Latvians and Russians ended up feeling
offended and seeing themselves in the role of victims in the process. Latvians were offended by
statements in which the people who were deported to Siberia were called Nazis and in which the
military annexation of Latvia by the USSR was interpreted as a voluntary merger. Russians, for their
part, were offended at being identified with the Soviet regime and its repressions. Russian-speakers
try to accentuate the difference between a policy of the totalitarian state and ordinary people. Many of
them considered the Baltic states as a well-developed part of Russia.
Fundamental differences in the interpretation of historical events can be an important factor in
the alienation of communities, because the ethnic self-understanding of an individual is inviolably
linked to the way in which that person interprets history. When the facts of history are interpreted in a
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united way, that is an element which helps in the formation of collective identity. When there is a lack
of unified interpretation about specific facts in history and extensive public debate is the result, it is
clear that there are contradictions among various groups in society, and each group uses history to
justify either existing demands or a view about the future of the relevant society. The different
interpretations that the two ethnic groups give to historical events are also seen quite clearly in the
attitudes that the two groups display toward symbols, memorial locations and holidays.
During the 1980s, the myth of the Soviet nation as a new, transnational identity  a myth that
was upheld by repression and assimilation  was put to rest. People were no longer punished for
declaring their ethnic belonging. National pride and a new sense of history, language and cultural
values  these were processes that took place not only in the constituent republics of the Soviet Union,
but also among non-titular minority populations in the various republics. People formed cultural
associations, opened schools and published newspapers. People no longer had to hide their views.
They could openly attend church services, celebrate Christmas and Easter. Contacts with other
countries (as well as with Latvians living abroad) expanded. Pluralism was expressed not only
through the establishment of many political parties, but also through an expansion in press freedom
and a prohibition against censorship.
It is difficult to evaluate contemporary processes of social integration and identity formation in
Latvia without reference to the situation in the mid-eighties. Throughout the Soviet years, migration
was the primary source of population growth and the basic reason for multifold increase in the
number of non-Latvians in Latvia and was one of the results of the Soviet Unions economic and
nationality policies. On the other hand, censuses illustrated the critical drop in the Latvian population,
from 75.5% in 1935 to 52% in 1989.
A large number of people migrated to Latvia during this period, people whose values and
understanding of history and interethnic relations were at variance with views prevailing among
Latvians. They and their children often did not learn Latvian and their communication with Latvians
was largely limited to the work place; they maintained the models of behavior to which they had
become accustomed. This period in Latvia saw a rapid development of a dual society marked not by
living together, but rather side-by-side. Interethnic contradictions were largely latent. Some of
these contradictions emerged during the transition, but powerful forces militating towards integration
have also been at work.
During the era of Soviet rule, Russian was the unofficial state language and enjoyed special
privileges compared to Latvian. In most places of employment, it was not considered a drawback if a
worker knew only Russian. At the same time, it was practically impossible for a Latvian not to know
Russian. The goal of the policy of Russification was to create a linguistic segregation and
asymmetrical bilinguality in the country. In practice this meant one-sided bilingualism: everyone was
expected to master Russian, but Russian-speakers did not have to learn the language of the people
among whom they were living. As a result although the population's ethnic composition is fragmented
and very diverse, in terms of household languages Latvia's residents fall into two groups - Latvian and
Russian-speakers.
Latvians comprise a linguistic minority in the greatest towns and the possibility to use Latvian
language in the public sphere is rather restricted as 20% of non-citizens do not know the Latvian
language at all, while 40% of non-citizens have very poor knowledge of Latvian. As a result 45% of
Latvians are worried about the survival of their native language (only 9% of Russians) and 27% of
Latvians (11% of Russians) express their concern about the prospect of loosing one's ethnic identity.
Paradoxically that every third non-citizen thinks that the most difficult citizen's duty is not to pay
taxes, but to learn the official language.
In the past few years, knowledge of Latvian has become more widespread, but changes for the
better have been insufficient. Until now, the change in the status of Latvian has been more a coercive
than a voluntary process, and a more concerted effort is the necessity to inculcate Latvian language
skills.
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The acquisition of Latvian language skills will not only promote the integration of non-
Latvians, but provide them the opportunity to participate fully in the political, social, and economic
life of the country. As the number of Latvian language speakers grows, the consequences of Soviet
Russification policy will be overcome and Latvian fears about the survival of the language and culture
in difficult demographic circumstances will dwindle. This will help to overcome linguistic segregation
and asymmetric bilingualism created by Soviet language policy, promote ethnic harmony, and create
basis for formation of a common national identity.
Studies of children's socialization experiences are important in order to understand the
individual's ethnicity and the origin of their attitudes. The life-story method in the study of children's
ethnicity proves, in general, the results obtained in psychological and sociological observations and
experiments. This shows that the method can be successfully applied to studies of life-course
development and, particularly, to studies of children's ethnic socialisation. The analytical potential of
the life-story method finds expression in approaching childhood facts through childhood memories, in
reconstructing childhood reality from an adult's perspective. Childhood memories, texts and narratives
that are constructions of the storyteller's consciousness, are thus relevant informants about real
childhood in real social networks.
Interethnic communication and acquisition of group identity are two relevant and interplaying
channels of children's ethnic socialisation. In a polyethnic milieu a child's ethnicity is shaped mainly
through the situationally changing in-group out-group contacts, and is perceived in early childhood,
while in a mono-ethnic habitat it is formed predominantly through acquiring the "primordial" own-
group culture in the wide sense, and is comprehended in late adolescence. This difference is
confirmed by comparing childhood memories of people of several generations.
The autobiographies of people who have grown up in an ethnically homogeneous milieu tend to
be more constructive. They comprise adult's analytical considerations, descriptions of group values
and customs, generalised assumptions and beliefs as building components of ethnicity. The life stories
of people whose childhood was spent in polyethnic surroundings tend to be more reconstructive and
are built around authentic childhood memories of ethnic contacts.
We fully agree with Knud Knudsen thesis that national identity could be specified within at
least two dimensions: national chauvinism and regime legacy and both these factors affect
xenophobia. National chauvinism involves shared images of the nations general standing. This
dimension reflects to what degree members of the nation see their countrys qualities as unique, of
higher value, more advanced or even superior than others. It is generally associated with
exclusiveness and is in some respect similar to nationalism in traditional sense. The regime legitimacy
concerns support for the basic social and political system, institutions and symbols of state.
Our research data indicate that the development of a common national identity in Latvia is
hampered not by Latvian or Russian ethnic chauvinism, but contrariwise - within both greatest
Latvian ethnic groups there is observed a rather widespread deficit of ethnic self-confidence. In our
opinion, this phenomenon may be explained as the behavioural syndrome of a historically demeaned
and in its further existence unsure minority. Latvians highly appraise their past, but they evaluate very
low the current social security system and economic achievements.
Many members of Russian community express a low level of pride about their nationality, and
in the same time only 58% of non-citizens named Latvia as homeland. A large part of non-citizen in
Latvia feels psychological uncertainty about their status and tomorrow. For both communities
political and economic freedom comes in a package with insecurity and uncertainty and both these
factors facilitate xenophobia.
The greatest distance between the ethnic groups was revealed in questions of national
sovereignty and state political legitimacy. In 1997, only 56% of non-Latvians supported the
independent statehood of Latvia and from 1994 till 1997, the number of those non-Latvians who
supported the status of Latvia as an independent state did not change. In spite of the fact that Latvians
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rather critically value the development of social and economic processes in Latvia, most of them are
patriots of their state and link their future with Latvia.
The immigrant ethnic minorities in Latvia have a different sense of identity, which is based in
dual loyalty toward their country of origin and toward Latvia. This fact has sometimes engendered a
bitter reaction from Latvians, who perceive citizenship as a moral identifier and an expression of
solidarity in the defence of their national interests. In their opinion, dual citizenship is a denial of
national symbols and a threat against Latvias independence. On this account Latvian public
increasingly supports the thesis that political integration in a state is the precondition for citizenship,
rather vice versa.
Naturalization process in Latvia is moving along very slowly. The results of the survey reveal a
contradiction in the attitudes and behaviour of non-citizens: on the one hand, they have a rather weak
wish to become naturalised, and, on the other hand, they have a negative attitude towards and
dissatisfaction with their status of non-citizens (at the same time 74% of non-citizens agree that, in
everyday life, there is no difference between citizens and non-citizens). Only small part of young non-
citizens (15 - 30 years old), eligible for applying for citizenship, are planning to use this opportunity.
Many non-citizens do not feel belonging to the Latvian state, it does not seem important to them to
vote in the elections or they do not wish to serve in the army. For the most part they are very seriously
alienated from the state. At the same time largest part of non-citizens would like their children to
become citizens of Latvia. Our data demonstrate that deficit of loyalty to state and unwillingness to
undertake the duties of citizen impede the development of non-citizens national identity. The attitude
of non-citizens towards citizenship and state create conditions favouring the formation of a two-
community society in Latvia.
According to sociological survey data, typical patterns of national identity are varying within
the nation - at the individual level, and can change over time. Individual background characteristics
and personal resources play an important role in identity formation. People with strong personal
resources appear more tolerant and this indicates that the process of identity formation must be
analysed not only in linkage with the political, but also socially economic processes of the society.
Notwithstanding the difficulties related to citizenship and language problems, there has been a
small degree of tension in ethnic relations. Here, too, non-violent conflict resolution has been the
norm. Judging from survey results, the majority of the population of Latvia (both Latvians and non-
Latvians) does not regard ethnic relations as a particularly acute problem where there is a danger of
excesses. Our data indicate that the largest part of Latvians and non-Latvians could not be classified as
ethnocentrists - many people in Latvia are in affinity with more than one ethnic group; there is a very
large number of ethnically mixed marriages. Communication between ethnic groups is rather
intensive (including contacts between friends, colleagues at work and relatives). The possibility of
ethnic confrontation is also reduced by the disunity within ethnic groups. The younger generation and
those who have a higher education are more open to contacts with people of other nationalities.
But at the same time Latvians feel a greater distance towards people of other ethnic groups, as
compared with Russians. A large part of Latvians does not recede from primitive ethnic stereotypes;
and, on the other hand, the Russification of communication hampers building of the network
between groups. All these phenomenon create a serious obstacle in communication between these
communities.
Various structural economic changes cause a serious deterioration in the standard of living of
many inhabitants of Latvia. Purchasing power of population has decreased, as well as the facility to
receive medical services and free of charge education. The extent of social protection has limited,
while unemployment and crime are on the rise. As a result, only 24% of respondents are satisfied with
the way in which democracy is developing in Latvia and a large part of Latvian population supports
economic protectionism, because they hope that such policy corresponds to Latvias labour market
needs and allows to protect economic independence of the country.
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Comparing the results of the survey with data obtained in the previous years, we can see that
people in Latvia are more satisfied with their welfare now. At the same time current level of economy
can not allow to satisfy basic needs to two-thirds of the Latvian population living in poverty, but
insecurity provokes xenophobia, impedes social harmony and development of democracy. Poverty
hampers participation, while low levels of participation makes it more difficult to reduce social
inequalities and poverty. Economic exclusion provokes political exclusion, as political rights are not
harmonised with the ability of individuals to take advantage of them.
The level of participation in Latvia is quite low. The quality of participation is also diminished
by the fact that there is a considerable deficit of positive experience and expectations of potential
actors; they lack skills, knowledge and self-confidence on the one hand, while those who are in power
are not prepared for social dialogue on the other hand. Latvian inhabitants have a very undeveloped
understanding of political ideologies, and their political views are often contradictory and a large part
of residents of Latvia have maintained a simplistic view of the relationship between an individual and
society in a non-totalitarian system. Trust to state institutions is low and a large part of Latvias
residents has a low opinion about their ability to influence events. The majority of inhabitants feel
alienated. The lack of clear boundaries between what is permitted and what is not, the instability of
juridical relationships, and the inability of the country to ensure the implementation of accepted norms
and laws  all of this created favourable conditions for legal and moral nihilism in Latvia, provoked
self-focused psychology of estranged individualism and impeded national identity building.
State identity is a part of the answer to the question of promoting a cohesive national identity in
the country with a large minority population. Notwithstanding the difficulties related with nonviolent
end of communist power, the withdrawal of the Russian army, the restoration of the Constitution, land
and property reform, state citizenship and language policy, Latvia has enjoyed remarkable social
stability. There has been a small degree of tension in ethnic relations here, and nonviolent conflict
resolution has been the norm. The paradox is that these processes have taken place against a backdrop
of severe economic stratification, political alienation and a very high level of civic dissatisfaction.
Minorities in Latvia, but not only in Latvia, are still sometimes perceived as a potential security threat
or unpleasant reminder of the past hegemony of neighbouring states. However, it may be that
minorities hold the best potential of acting as bridges, as human networks weaving together the
region.
At the present moment there are several problems in the sphere of culture that impede
integration of society: 1. Uneven distribution of cultural values; 2. Insufficient development of
common cultural spaces and common cultural values 3. Gap between cultural policy and social needs.
Currently, ethnic stereotypes are being reproduced vigorously, cultural differences and singularities
are overemphasised, common or similar traits are ignored, and mutual enrichment between cultures is
undervalued in principle and practice. We think that the goals of integration are: 1) to create an
understanding of values, moral norms, responsibilities and rights, that foster trust, tolerance, and
solidarity within society; 2) to create the preconditions for a balanced and dynamic civil society; 3) to
safeguard cultural assets and to encourage cultural dialogue; 4) to guarantee individuals right to
freely express, protect and develop his/her ethnic, cultural and religious identity.
The average Latvian is ready to accept a Russian-speaker as a neighbour but not as a co-citizen.
Thus, the political behaviour of Latvians is more nationalistic than their social behaviour. We can
expect that the identification of Russian-speaking settlers with their place of residence will increase
(at the moment many of them has uncertainty about their authentic homeland). But if this process is
not supplemented by the increase of their loyalty to Latvian state, the inter-ethnic conflict possibilities
can grow.
Survey results show that in order to feel secure about the correctness of their vote in a
potential referendum on EU membership, respondents want to know precisely how membership
would influence Latvias economic development and the well-being of inhabitants, as well as how it
would affect Latvias external security and defence. Compared to other countries, Latvia has many
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respondents who feel that their country would gain from membership in the EU. Largest part of
Latvian population think that EU membership would most positively affect Latvias inhabitants as
consumers (goods, commercial and public services, as well as education and health) and not as the
creators of material values. Many respondents see the gains of membership in the context of the
development of the individual and society, and not only in economic terms.
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the way in which national, state and regime identities are
formed in Latvia and the characteristics that are related to this process. We hope that the way in which
we have conducted this analysis and the conclusions that we have drawn may be of use in studying
identities in other social contexts, too. In drawing our conclusions, we purposefully tried to stay away
from generalisations that could be extrapolated to other social concepts. This represents our
conceptual position. We do not believe that it is possible to establish a list of social properties which
exists outside of context and which is final, one which would allow us to describe a social
phenomenon such as identity in any universal way. This is a list that can always be supplemented or
shortened. There will always be changing links among these various properties, and their nature is not
universally causal.
The effect of individual factors on identity formation is contextually conditioned, and for that
reason the factors can be ranked in a hierarchy only in the context of specific social spaces and time
frames. Theoretical analysis of identities and practical consciousness is hindered by the fact that the
knowledgeability and reflexivity of the relevant agents are fairly different. Their practical
consciousness is fragmented and contradictory, and experience is reinterpreted at regular intervals.
We feel that it is precisely the reflexive abilities of individuals, which represent the foundation for the
continuity and change of their activities.
Identities also cannot be described as stable and non-contradictory forms of consciousness
because practical consciousness is temporally selective. In other words, agents are forever adjusting
their ideas and value judgements under the influence of new information; they re-evaluate the facts,
which are related to individual and collective experience. At specific moments in time and under
specific conditions of social life, they devote greater attention to some aspects of social life than they
do to others. Whats more, when there are changes in social conditions, in the understanding of
individuals about what is possible or impossible, in the political agenda of the state, etc., there can
also be important changes in the cohort of factors which help to shape individual understanding, and
the importance of these various factors can shift. At the same time, survey results have shown that
people in transitional societies are often under the influence of the phenomenon that is known as
cognitive dissonance, i.e., their overt behaviour is inconsistent with their sentiments and belief
patterns.
When we analyse the way in which identities develop, we must take into account the purposeful
actions of individuals, the conditions which obstruct or empower these actions, and the intended and
unintended consequences of the actions. The fact that the practical consciousness of agents is
absorbed into social contexts means that the two phenomenon must be analysed in parallel, taking
into account the autonomous nature of consciousness and social context. In other words, we must
avoid reductionism. The identities of members of various ethnic groups in one country can form under
the influence of different factors, and so they can be endogenous at different levels, too.  In our survey
we analysed various groups with the same set of variables, but the results of our investigation show
that each ethnic group has its own specific causal and other relationships among these variables. This
means that the way in which identities in various ethnic groups are formed can be based on differing
scenarios, and processes in the various communities may well not be appropriate for any
generalisations.
Through the idea of social context we understand environment to be a social, not a geographic
concept. One geographic, economic or political environment can have a number of social spaces in
which changes or, to the contrary, conservatism can be affected by endogenous and exogenous factors
alike. Sociology often devotes too little attention to exogenous factors. In studying identity formation
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in Latvia, as far as we are concerned, it is important to devote particular attention to the way in which
processes in the European Union, Russia, Estonia and Lithuania affect the endogenous developmental
factors which exist in Latvia. It is precisely through the interaction of factors in this cohort that the
knowledge, knowledgeability, resources, values and practices of agents become routine or undergo
changes. We believe that the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors is of an anti-static
nature and is possessed of configurative invariation  i.e., in each of the segments of this interaction,
there can be different links among the various elements, and the links can be of varying intensity.
Our survey data show that unlike consciousness, greater stability is typical of the practice of
individuals, and so we devoted particular attention to the issue of individual and collective resources.
Without an ability to expand their resource base radically, agents have limited opportunities to change
behavioural scenarios, and this leads them to reproduce existing social relations consciously and
unconsciously. The deficit of individual and collective resources, as far as we are concerned, is one of
the reasons for the high potential for recoursivity in transitional societies  individuals reproduce the
conditions, which lead to their accustomed behavioural forms, while innovative actions become
unlikely.
Any researcher who is interested in identity formation must inevitably seek answers to a serious
of questions. Why is it so important for us to have a sense of belonging? Why do we consider some
strangers whom weve never met before to be our own kind of people, while we see others as
outsiders? What is it that makes us feel at home in some places, even if weve never been there
before? Why are we proud of the achievements of people whose paths have never crossed ours? Why
are we tolerant toward some groups of people and intolerant toward others? Why are so many people
afraid of not belonging? Why do so many people think that the openness of the space around them is a
threat while withdrawing into themselves is a form of salvation? And why do people more often speak
of common destinies as something that was true in the past, not something that will be true in the
future?
Discussions about culture are most often fruitless because participants in the discussion
understand the concept itself differently. Culture can be analysed as a semiotic, anthropological or
sociological phenomenon, and each of these types of analysis concentrates not only on a different
range of issues, but also on a differing thesaurus of words and concepts. This makes it far more
difficult to ensure a convergence of ideas.
When we analyse the role of culture in the integration of a society, we must not ignore any of
these perspectives, because otherwise our mission would be all but impossible. Because of our limited
opportunities, we have analysed culture mostly as a sociological and anthropological category. In
other words, we focus on culture as a system of norms which influence the lifestyles of individuals
and the relationships between people. Thus defined, culture covers the understanding of individuals
about their rights and obligations or, in other words, the limitations on their freedom, which they
freely accept. The semiotic aspects of culture are reviewed only from the perspective of the
communicative competence of agents in the discussion, where one of the key conditions is a shared
understanding of the meaning of words. If communicative competence is in place, each agent can
understand, for example, when the word maybe means maybe and when it means never.
From the very beginning we would like to stress that the mutual understanding of agents who
have been socialised even in very different cultures is based on a very strict foundation  the identical
nature of our psychological structures and our ability to empathise with others. Irrespective of the
cultural context in which we have been socialised, we all know such emotions as joy, hate, love,
jealously, pride or insecurity. In all cultural environments  even those that are diametrically opposed
 the socialisation of agents involves the formation of emphatic experience, which allows them to
sense the emotions and feelings of another person. That is why we can still be touched by the work of
Homer and Shakespeare, why the heroes whom they created are not strange to us, theyre not
outsiders. It is precisely this element of our consciousness, which serves as the cornerstone for
unlimited cultural dialogue over the spans of time and space.
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We think that the most appropriate allegory in describing culture in a syncretic way (i.e., in the
context of its relationship to the integration of society) is the Roman god Janus  the god of doorways
and of time, the symbol of each beginning and each end. Janus is usually portrayed with two faces,
each pointed in the opposite direction. The suggestion is that he simultaneously looks at the future and
at the past, and it is important that one of the faces is always that of a youth and the second  of an old
man. Culture, too, is distinctly dual in nature  it is both open to the future and locked up in the past in
a way, which limits freedom. Culture can maintain that which is sacral or it can deny it. It can involve
innovation, it can involve a game.
Culture has a dual nature not only in terms of time, but also in terms of space. On the one hand,
culture is inevitably linked to a social space, but on the other hand, it is seldom self-enclosed and
socially endogenous; it is constantly in dialogue with other cultures that have emerged through other
social contexts. The rooting of cultures in social contexts is a key condition for the self-reproduction
of phenomena and for the effective interaction of agents. At the same time, however, when the nature
of social relationships changes radically, it is precisely these roots which can hinder the adaptation of
individuals to new social conditions. Changes in values and behaviour are particularly complicated for
people who represent culture that are trapped in time or space. Isolation is a very favourable factor in
making cultural values sacrosanct.
Culture is not something that can be constructed artificially or pressed upon a society. Only if
an agent is able to confront different meanings and symbols freely can these meanings and symbols
overcome the limitations of collective and individual experience, becoming emancipated from these
obstacles. People who have cultural patterns that are less rigid and thus have a higher capacity for
dialogue have an easier time in distancing themselves from routine practices, thus restructuring their
behaviour. At the same time, though, this emancipation  this stepping away from routine  brings a
number of existential problems to light, and agents have to deal with these if they are to be able to
position themselves in the new social relationships. In the context of social integration, of primary
importance is the fact that the self-denial of cultural values inevitably causes problems with identity
and with accustomed patterns of social interaction.
Culture is very important in terms of the integration of society in Latvia, not only because
Latvias society has a complicated ethnic structure, but also because the cultural competence and
cultural values of people who have arrived in Latvia through various waves of migration are quite
different.
Even though we do not feel that our conclusions can be widely generalised for other social
contexts, we do believe that other researchers can use some of the concepts and methodologies which
we used in our own analysis. In order to understand identity formation, it is first of all important to
understand the way in which endogenous and exogenous factors interact. Secondly, we believe that it
is necessary to analyse both private interaction (among agents) and public discourse (between agents
on the one hand and groups or institutions on the other). Third, in order to understand conservatism or
changes in identities, it is necessary to analyse the rules and resources (individual and collective,
material and non-material  knowledge in particularly) which are at hand, as well as the conditions
which affect the agents actions, thinking and values. We believe that when analysing identity
formation, voluntarism is by no means a better methodological platform than reductionism is.
Recoursivity and social innovations can be explained as phenomena, which are dictated by specific
ideologies our changes therein, but this approach does not provide an answer to the question of where
the vitality of ideologies is found or, on the contrary, what promotes their necrosis. Fourth, in order to
understand identity formation, we must analyse the social phenomenon of alienation, because these
are two processes that are closely linked. And fifth, identity formation can be understood only as a
part of wider cultural processes  ones which have their own logic that cannot be explained through
political or economic factors.
If we are to understand the processes that have occurred in the 1990s, we must take at least a
brief look at the personal identities that were typical of the Soviet era, as well as the conditions under
59 Summary
which these identities were formed. Under the auspices of Soviet ideology, the relationship between
the private and the public sphere was seen as a conflict, and this approach was the basis upon which
the regime formed its identity-shaping policies. In so-called developed socialist societies, the
private sphere was separated from the public sphere in a way which radically different from the
processes that were commonly accepted in the West. In the West, for example, there was minimal
interference by the state in the family and religious lives of individuals, and any such interference was
strictly regulated by law. In the countries of the socialist bloc, by contrast, officials at various levels
de-privatised this sphere on a very regular basis. There were extensive social controls over the
political convictions, economic activities and even individual consumption of people, thus narrowing
the private nature of these areas of activity. The public sphere included just about everything that
related even indirectly to the political and economic interaction of individuals.
It would not, however, be right to say that the expansionism of the public sphere in the socialist
block touched on all aspects of the lives of Soviet individuals equally. The denial of all non-
economic and non-political differences and the declaration of many of these differences as
insignificant meant that the realm of public discussion did not include many of the subjects that were
matters of intensive debate in the West.
Despite the fact that socialist ideologues were forever loudly proclaiming the ideas of
internationalism, for example, issues of inter-ethnic relationships were very seldom discussed
publicly; they seemed to exist in something of a silent zone. Soviet passports listed the nationality
of their bearers, and governing institutions were fairly active in implementing what they themselves
dubbed nationality policies, but there were also fairly intensive efforts to put limits on ethnic and
political relationships and to narrow the range of people who had the right to express their views
about such matters in public ways. Any unauthorised attempts to engage in a public discussion of
inter-ethnic relationships were almost always classified as attempts to foment hatred among
nationalities. Any unique aspects of one or another ethnos were usually dismissed as remnants of the
past which must be overcome.
In fact the Soviet regime interpreted ethnicity as an ethnographic category, and residents were
forced to follow suit. Even the process which the regime called support for the development of
national cultures most often involved either a lack of bans against folk art, or the ability of non-
Russians to speak their own languages in their cultural space. There was, however, very strict
censorship to ensure that cultural activities in any language propagandised Soviet values. Culture, in
other words, was nothing more than a means for ideology. This policy was neatly encapsulated in the
Soviet-era slogan Culture must be national in form and class-based in content. The regime never
tried to hide its belief that the goal of culture must be to ensure that the principles of Marxist ideology
might become the personal convictions of individuals in the Soviet Union. Many artists who wanted
to escape these strictures began to use the language of Aesop  subtexts, which were not
understandable to everyone in society, thus making one part of culture esoteric. As soon as censorship
was lifted, the cultural space of the former Soviet Union very quickly became saturated with works of
art of the widest variety of directions, styles and ideological content. The result, inevitably, was what
can be described as culture shock for many people in society.
It must be remembered that the Soviet Union officially was a union of national republics, and
many people in the various republics  especially members of the indigenous nationalities  saw
ethnicity as a political concept. Russians, for their part, most often saw ethnicity as a private issue,
because the public sphere in all of the republics was strongly dominated by the Russian language.
Russians very seldom saw the ethos of other groups as demos. Only the Russian ethos was never a
problem in the Soviet Union, and only the Russian language had a political meaning to it. Soviet
language policy was one of the ways in which non-Russian ethnicity was shunted into the private
sphere, where it continued to develop in a more or less autonomous regime. Even after Latvia won its
independence, it was Russian migrants and not those from other language groups who continued to
insist that there were no ethnicity-based problems and took a radical stand against any attempt to
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make Latvian ethnicity a public issue. It is not unimportant that analogous protests these days are
being seen in the countries of the CIS  Ukraine, for example.
Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union was a de facto ideology of the state, but the
nationalism of other ethnic groups was forced to develop in latent and non-manifested ways in the
private sphere. The inequality of language in the public sphere particularly provoked this situation.
Linguistic inequality promoted Russian loyalty to the Soviet regime and to the great Fatherland. A
popular Russian song had it that my address is not a house or a street, my address is the Soviet
Union. This was one of the reasons why in the national republics of the ex-Soviet Union, the political
values of Russians and other ethnic groups transformed at differing rates  as could be seen in
subsequent events.
Back in the 1980s there were several other factors which led to decreased differences among
the social and ethnic groups that were resident in Latvia and led to more unified individual
consciousness and self-awareness. We feel that of particular importance was the fact that the regime
did not ensure basic human rights  freedom of conviction, the right to express ones views freely, to
receive and disseminate information and ideas, the freedom of association, etc. All of this served very
much to hinder the individuation of people in the Soviet Union. Members of society did not engage in
a free exchange of views, they had a poor understanding of their own values and interests and those of
other people, and the result caused problems in the development of their individuality and of group
pluralism.
We should particularly emphasise the fact that in the Soviet Union, only those identities which
were stigmatised in relation to a persons place in so-called work collectives and professional
structures were recognised as legitimate or correct, while any identities that were not politically
sanctioned were viewed with suspicion. The Soviet authorities respected only those kinds of
identities, which promoted the involvement of individuals in politically structured groups  those
which could be controlled and which helped to shape the loyalty of people toward the existing regime.
We feel that this process can best be described as the codifying of consciousness, because identities
were forced upon people from above. They did not emerge as the result of individual self-
determination or choice.
Here it is necessary to remember, moreover, that in the first decades of Soviet power in Latvia,
there were intensive efforts to shape so-called class-based consciousness as the only ideologically
permissible form of identity. Overtaken by the ideas of proletarian solidarity and global revolution,
the communist ideologists of the day firmly denied any suggestion that boundaries among states could
serve as a criterion for social belonging. In the pre-perestroika period, by contrast, communist
ideology claimed that group differences in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries had been
overcome, and the main forms of belonging were the Soviet nation and the socialist camp. In fact
this means that the only criterion which allowed people to separate us from them in a way that
was ideologically acceptable was the existence of frontiers between countries  boundaries which
regularly were described as holy. From the initial Soviet arsenal of ideology, only the idea of
antagonism among these groups survived.
Under the influence of this ideology, people began to develop a form of self-understanding
which has since been described in the literature as Homo Sovieticus. In this analysis, it is important
that the ideological baggage from the Soviet period continued to have a great influence on the way in
which people developed self-identification when the Soviet Union itself was gone. We now have new
circumstances in which there is a market economy and in which cultures compete with one another,
but many people in society continue to see group pluralism as a socially undesirable phenomenon.
The de facto recognition even of very obvious group differences is often perceived as an attempt to
legitimise these differences.
Because limitations of human rights applied to both communities equally, both groups had very
limited opportunities to organise their social space and to manifest and defend their interests. These
issues did not become important in interpersonal communications, and the process was fairly
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depoliticised. Ethnic harmony during Soviet times was also facilitated by the fact that the social space
in Latvia was not particularly segregated, even though Latvians were in the minority in cities and
Russians were in the minority in rural areas. There were, however, fairly close professional contacts
among members of the various ethnic groups, and inter-ethnic marriage was not uncommon either.
The information spaces of the two communities overlapped to a considerable extent, because
Soviet censorship was quite effective at controlling knowledge. If we look at the behaviour of
members of the two groups in the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism, then we basically
cant point to any major differences between the practices of the two groups. Administrative regions
in the European section of the Soviet Union involved fairly minor differences in the lifestyles of
residents  changes in the way of life occurred not because of a persons ethnic identity, but rather as
a result of educational levels and material welfare. There were few differences between Latvians and
Russians when it came to average educational and income levels, and in the late 1980s both
communities were dominated by the desire to get as much free time and as easy a life as possible; the
psychology of a consumer society was rapidly emerging. Critics of the Soviet Union seized upon this
fact to comment sarcastically that the Soviet Union was a consumer country without any consumer
goods.
Because the manifestation of identities was limited by ideology and by Soviet rules concerning
proper behaviour that were perhaps unwritten but that involved serious threats of sanctions if
violated, people became firmly accustomed to hiding their true views. The division of us and
them existed, however, both in latent and open forms, because differentiation among the ethnic
groups was promoted by several important factors. First of all, Latvia encountered significant
immigration of people from other parts of the soviet Union, but these people chose to adapt the local
social environment to their accustomed practice instead of trying to become integrated into the
existing structure. Immigrants were provided with various privileges and life opportunities that were
aimed at promoting the flow of migrants, and this process was viewed with considerable dislike by the
indigenous population  not just ethnic Latvians, but also Russians who had settled in Latvia before
the Soviet era began.
Soviet ideology was such that anything that was different was usually categorised as being
hostile, so there few traditions of tolerance emerged in society. Undoubtedly this hindered any
interaction or mutual understanding between the two groups. Communication barriers were also put
up by the fact that many Russians did not learn the Latvian language, and this proved to be an
obstacle in the shaping of their ethnic competence. This less-than-adequate interaction among ethnic
communities was a good breeding ground for the emergence of ethnic stereotyping.
As was noted before, the information space of the two communities largely overlapped, but
Russians were more subject to ideological censorship than Latvians were, because Latvians had
access not only to official information, but also to various forms of information that were not
subject to censorship. Many people had books at home which had been published before the Soviet
occupation and which contained information that directly confronted Soviet ideology. Many Latvians
also had relatives who had emigrated to the West during World War II, and contacts with them
provided not only a better understanding of history, but also a clearer sense of what was really
happening in those countries which Moscow described as being the place of rotting capitalism.
Latvians also tended to listen to foreign radio broadcasts in the Latvian language.
It was also important that the population structure of Latvian rural areas was dominated by
single-family farms, while in Russia it was far more common to find villages in which fairly durable
traditions of obshchina were found. Latvians were far more likely to give public recognition to ideas,
which emphasised the importance of the individual and the individuals interests. Russians, especially
those of the older generations, were not inclined to recognise the value of individualism in any public
way  that was simply a matter of poor manners. Public discourse, therefore, most often involved
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praise for the values of collectivism. This suggests that traditions of dissimulation86 were more
common among Russians  they were subject to the Soviet regime and its ideology considerably
longer than the Latvians were.
In sum, we can say that the public space in Soviet-era Latvia was considerably more
homogenised than the sphere was. Whats more, the influence of various factors, which promoted
unification or differentiation was fairly balanced, and being alongside never did transform into
being together. The social environment was poorly integrated, and individual members of society
were largely alien to one another. The result was a society that was quite inert. In the absence of
political conditions for the self-identification of identity, and in the presence of the controls of a police
state, ethnic relationships were not institutionalised, and contradictions among ethnic groups were
cemented in place, albeit mostly in latent forms.
In analysing the sphere of public relations in the 1990s, we should first of all look at the way in
which the private was reconstructed into the public, as well as, secondly, at the way in which these
processes influenced the emergence of identities. During the course of public discourse, people first of
all engaged in self-definition in relation to the past and in relation to the shifting situation in which
they had found themselves. The resulting debates were both recursive and innovative in nature.
During the development of public discourse, the views of the Latvian community were more or
less consolidated. Latvians far less than Russians adjusted their views or public behavior in the course
of public discussions, and this made it far easier for them to establish identities. The Latvian system of
political parties in the 1990s, moreover, was one which represented the reaction of the Latvian
community to alternative proposals concerning ethnic, not economic, models. The electoral behavior
of Latvians shows that centrist tendencies dominated in this system of political heterogeneity, and the
political forces which did not attract the support of significant numbers of voters almost inevitably
ended up recognizing the legitimacy of decisions that were ideologically unacceptable to them.
More complicated processes took place in the Russian and other ethnic minority communities.
There have been many different views about the Latvian state and about the principles of interaction
among ethnic groups, but there has been little in the way of any lasting centripetal movement in this
process. This has made it more difficult for members of these communities to establish identities.
During the Soviet years, Russians became the most denationalised and most Sovietised nationality in
the Soviet Union. Their consolidation into a separate national group has been occurring very slowly.
Russian intellectuals in the fields of the humanities have been the most active in attempting to bring
Russians together and to revive the former cultural traditions of Russians in Latvia.
Some members of Russian society have integrated into Latvias system of social relationships
successfully, while others are still behaving in accordance to Soviet-era models. It is precisely this
diversity in the Russian community which has made it difficult for members of the community to
crystallized their identities. The Latvian community, for its part, lacks any positions that have been
articulated clearly and consistently in the political process, and Latvians are often disoriented when it
comes to the thinking of the Russian community. Any shifts in the Russian community inevitably
have resonance in the Latvian community  often resulting in less than adequate conclusions about
what is really happening.
In order to draw conclusions about the conditions which led to this situation, it is necessary to
take at least a brief look to the aspects of Latvias political system formation which were of the
greatest importance in the formation of identities among members of both communities.
First of all, the bipolar political movements which were the Latvian Peoples Front (LTF) and
the Interfront  movements which were fairly homogeneous in terms of ethnic membership 
appeared nearly at the same time (in October 1988 and January 1989 respectively), the two
organizations had not only radically different political platforms, but also very different ethnic
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structures among their supporters. The Interfront, from the very beginning, was a satellite
organization of the Latvian Communist Party, and there were virtually no Latvians among its
members. The LTF, for its part, was formed by a merger of several groups which had been in
opposition to the Soviet regime since 1986, and thus the LTF earned the favor both of Latvians and of
many non-Latvians. The Russian electorate became considerably polarized, but the LTF at the same
time was interested in preserving ethnic tolerance so as not to lose the support of the Russian
community in Latvia. This allowed the LTF to prevail in parliamentary elections in 1990 and to
ensure that a majority of the Latvian public in 1991 voted in favor of Latvian independence in a
referendum (64% of Latvias residents voted for independence, even though ethnic Latvians made up
only 52% of the countrys population).
Several studies have suggested that in the early 1990s, three different groups of people emerged
in the Russian community  people with fairly differing ideas about their own national identities.
Approximately 40% of non-Latvians of voting age identified themselves with the Soviet Union.
Approximately the same percentage of non-Latvians supported Latvias independence, i.e., they
identified themselves with Latvia. The remaining could not make a choice between these two options.
The relationship between the two ethnic communities was very much affected by the fact that in
January 1991, the Soviet military, the so-called black beret or OMON special forces and leftist
Russians all tried to persuade Mikhail Gorbachev to institute presidential rule in Latvia. Many
Russians were severely opposed to this solution, and they worked with ethnic Latvians to put up
barricades outside of major buildings in Rigas city center.
The constitutional right of citizens to join in political parties and various public organizations
has been in place in Latvia since January 1990, but Latvians and non-Latvians have not made equal
use of these opportunities. Some Russian organizations have tried to work out political platforms that
would be acceptable to a majority of the Russian community, but the process cannot be said to have
been successful. In the last parliamentary elections in 1998, more than 400,000 non-Latvians had
voting rights, but the union which was made up of so-called Russian parties won 135,700 votes 
votes from a bit more than 30% of the non-Latvian electorate, in other words. Research data show that
more than one-half of non-Latvians voted for parties in which all leading politicians are Latvians, and
only one leading party  For the Fatherland and Freedom  has no Russian electorate. Two of the
parties that have won a fair amount of trust from the Russian community are now in the governing
coalition. This allows us to conclude that Latvian politicians, who have dominated in Latvian politics
for the last 10 years, have managed to come up with ethnic policy positions that are acceptable to a
significant percentage of the Russian communitys members. It is precisely these positions which will
most likely serve as a basis for consolidation of society in the future, strengthening the concept of
us in society on the basis of political, not ethnic considerations.
Despite the fact that many non-Latvians are loyal to the Latvian state and recognize the value of
a market economy, they have not formed any parties which are liberal in their thinking, loyal to the
Latvian state, and able to win the trust of a significant share of the Russian community. This shows
that the tendencies of entropy in the Russian community are still stronger than any trends toward
collective action.
One of the main causes for this situation is the fact that various groups in the Russian
community have very different resources at hand when it comes to adapting to the new social
relationships which exist in Latvia and to integrating into society. People with limited social resources
 mostly Russians who speak only Russian  have made fairly confrontational political demands
which have made it more difficult for the Russian community to consolidate.
The segregation of information spaces in Latvia has to a great extent been promoted by the fact
that monolinguistic Russians represent not only a fairly large group, but also one which is closed off
when it comes to communications. Many Latvians greatly distrust information that is disseminated by
the leftist Russian press. Generally speaking, the mass media have been quite selective in reflecting
the issues of various ethnic groups, and this process of knowledge control has resulted in a low
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level of ethnic knowledgeability in society. Public discussions that have been tense and not very
proper have done little to promote ethnic tolerance. All of this has critically hindered interethnic
dialogue and has instead promoted political polarization.
During our work, we conducted an analysis of press articles which told us that the way in which
the identity of Latvias residents is shaped is strongly affected by things that are happening in the
European Union, Russia, Estonia and Lithuania. Over the last 10 years, Western European countries
and Russia have tried quite actively to influence Latvias national policies when it comes to
interethnic relationships, and the judgements and evaluations of officials in those countries have had
considerable social resonance. During the course of public discussions, Latvians and Russians are
both forced to adapt their views to the evaluations of international organizations. The OSCE has been
particularly important in these processes, and although this organizations has received more criticism
than compliments, there is reason to believe that debate over the OSCEs recommendations have not
only influenced the decisions of politicians  they have also had an impact on the views of large
groups in society, bringing the thinking of members of the two major ethnic groups closer together.
On the other hand, there is also reason to believe that the many announcements which Russian
politicians have made about the supposed lack of legitimacy of the Latvian state and the supposedly
massive violations of human rights here have served to promote the activities of nationalist radicals in
both communities, thus obstructing the processes of consolidation in society.
The formation of identities is also influenced very powerfully not only by political, but also by
economic factors. At the beginning of major political changes in Latvia in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the majority of Russians in Latvia were convinced that Latvias economy was so closely linked
to Russias that any break in the links would inevitably cause the states economic bankruptcy. The
introduction of Latvias national currency was viewed with considerable skepticism by many
Russians in Latvia  people who felt that it was political process that had nothing to do with
economics. The dominant view in the Russian community was that Latvia was completely dependent
on Russias sales markets and raw materials, and so any break in economic links would lead to a
radical deterioration in the standard of living of the population. This judgement was not without
serious justification. Latvia is poor in natural resources, its industries at that time were fully targeted
toward the Russian market, and the ability of industries to export to the West were fairly limited.
A greater proportion of Russians than Latvians were people who did not accept the market
economy and wanted a restoration of the socialist system of economics. When the economic
changes began, the government was often unable to control the leaders of state-owned companies,
many of whom simply shifted most of the income of these enterprises to private companies which
they themselves owned. Later the money was used to privatize the companies which the same
directors had previously made unprofitable. Because many economic sectors in Soviet times were
controlled by Russians, Latvians often think that the benefits of this situation were accrued by a
Russian economic elite. Whats more, many Latvians did not trust the political loyalty of the Russian
economic elite. That elite, for its part, was worried about the idea that Latvians might use their
political power to push Russians out of the economic space which they had conquered. There is
reason to say, therefore, that differing attitudes toward economic processes created a gap between the
two major ethnic groups. This was one of the causes of obstruction in the establishment of identities.
Subsequent events demonstrated that most of these assumptions were false. Industry shifted its
focus quite quickly on western markets, and the companies and banks that were closely linked to the
Russian economy suffered considerable losses because of Russias economic crisis. They were forced
either to halt cooperation with their eastern partners or at least to narrow it considerably. The Latvian
currency, the lats, is one of the most stable currencies in Eastern Europe, and this has helped to keep
inflation low in the country. Latvias residents enjoy a higher standard of living than is the case in
Russia, despite the fact that Latvia has so few natural resources.
There are still more Russians than Latvians who want a restoration of the socialist economic
system, but their numbers are declining year by year. In the latter half of the 1990s many members of
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the Latvian political elite used their administrative abilities to become actively involved in the
privatization of state-owned companies quite effectively, and they were basically interested in the
companies that had not yet been privatized. The Latvian political elite did not use its power to push
Russians out of the economy, and the Russian economic elite, as a result, has demonstrated its
political loyalty on a number of occasions. This means that there were economic winners and losers in
both communities  the percentage of people in both communities who are poor does not differ. As a
result of all of this, the division between us and them formed on the basis of material, not ethnic
considerations, and this allowed large groups in society to begin to form non-ethnic national
identities.
Cultural processes in independent Latvia have maintained some elements of historical
continuity, but have also gained new traits. Continuity can be noted in the high prestige awarded to
culture, the widespread participation of people in amateur cultural activities such as choir singing, and
the nurturing in Latvia of traditional forms of folk art. Radical changes have taken place in the
relationship between culture and economics and politics. Intellectual freedom has defined a new
diversity of artistic self-expression, the development of subcultures, and the free progress of Latvian
and minority culture. At the same time, values have begun to be influenced and leveled intensely by
mass culture.
Currently, ethnic stereotypes are being reproduced vigorously, cultural differences and
singularities are overemphasised, common or similar traits are ignored, and mutual enrichment
between cultures is undervalued in principle and practice. Moreover, there is no institutional structure
that could promote a unified and diverse cultural life as a part of the integration process, bringing
together Latvians and minority representatives.
At the same time, we must also point out that the processes of social integration cannot be
explained solely as the consequence of endogenous processes or as the result of purposeful actions by
decision-makers. Research in Latvia over the past decade has sowed that mass cultural consumption
has become considerably more homogenised, especially among young people. This has largely been
the result of the influence of foreign popular culture.
We have reason to ask about the impact on national identities and local cultures of the globally
oriented production and distribution of popular cultural artefacts. It is difficult to judge whether the
homogenisation and consumption of these popular cultural artefacts has been translated into a
homogenisation of other cultural practices, beliefs and identities. It is not clear how much cultural
globalisation is challenging and eroding the position of national sentiments and reconstructing
indigenous cultures.
The issue is particularly complicated in Latvia, because there were unification tendencies in
pop culture consumption in the country in the 1960s and 1970s, while in the last few years the variety
of cultural artifacts that are on offer has skyrocketed (thanks in particular to the emergence of the
Internet), and this has led to a considerably increased level of the individualization of cultural
consumption.
Sociological studies have shown that the unification of cultural consumption has not had much
effect on communication among young people of various ethnic groups in Latvia or their overall
integration. In the 1960s and 1970s, we can say, the behavioral patterns of young people drew closer
and closer to one another  there was shared knowledge, a shared vocabulary, and a set of
representational symbols which are typical of youth culture. All of these things served to overcome
communicative barriers in a very important way. It is also significant that the youth culture today is
not political, it is not forced upon anyone, and it cannot be privatized by any specific ethnic group.
At the same time, however, it is a culture which changes all the time, and that is a process which
involves very different sub-cultures that often deny each other. Changes in music and clothing styles
are especially typical of this process.
We would like to claim that young people from this particular generation lived in a unified
cultural time (something that can be said with much less certainly about members of older
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generations), but in more or less parallel spaces which overlap quite minimally in physical terms.
Latvian young people today go to different entertainment facilities than non-Latvian young people do
 even though their musical tastes are perhaps very much the same. A common social space has more
often emerged among sub-groups in both ethnic communities that are few in number and in this sense
marginal. Perhaps members of these groupings have been brought together specifically by the sense of
being outsiders.
It is fairly likely that the shaping of identities will to an increasing extent be influenced by
cultural, not political factors. The emergence of a common cultural space, in turn, can have a
favorable effect on the establishment of multicultural and, by extension, ethnic tolerance. This will
involve not the unification of values and norms, but rather quite the opposite  further fragmentation
of them. Broader cultural competence and a more pronounced tolerance toward otherness can create a
stable foundation for the integration of society. We can assume, therefore, that as cultural
consumption individualizes, fragmentation among young people will become even more pronounced,
but there will also be a restructuring of the process  ethnic factors will play a lesser and lesser role in
culture processes; and this is likely to facilitate the process of integration of society.
In the area of private life, too, relationships between Latvians and non-Latvians are gradually
improving. It must be noted here that everyday nationalism in Latvia has never been particularly
widespread, but language conflicts have not been a rarity, especially since Latvians have begun to
speak Latvian much more widely in interpersonal contacts. This cause problems in the lives of many
Russians, especially older people  some felt that this was aggressive behavior aimed at them.
Although trends of ethnic self-limitation became stronger during this period of time, conflicts between
members of the two communities did not stop at any time, because the two communities are deeply
interrelated in work relationships. It was specifically in the private sector that people began to be
convinced of the non-aggressive efforts of the other ethnic group and of the ethnic problems which
existed. Although alienation between members of the two groups continues to exist, open
unfriendliness is viewed by most people in Latvia as poor behavior.
In general, we can conclude that the processes which occurred in the political, economic,
cultural and private spheres of life in Latvia created proper conditions for a situation in which
members of the two communities could establish non-conflicting national, state and regime identities.
